Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics
We characterize the smallest faces of the polyhedron of strategy profiles that could possibly be made asymptotically stable under some reasonable deterministic dynamics. These faces are Kalai and Samet's (1984) persistent retracts and are spanned by Basu and Weibull's (1991) CURB sets based on a natural (and, in a well-defined sense, minimal) refinement of the best-reply correspondence. We show that such a correspondence satisfying basic properties such as existence, upper hemi-continuity, and convex-valuedness exists and is unique in most games. We introduce a notion of rationalizability based on this correspondence and its relation to other such concepts. We study its fixed-points and their relations to equilibrium refinements. We find, for instance, that a fixed point of the refined best reply correspondence in the agent normal form of any extensive form game constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is weak perfect Bayesian in every subgame. Finally, we study the index of its fixed point components.
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