Learning to be prepared
Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices: salience, inertia, the formation of habits, the use of rules of thumb, or the locking in on certain modes of behavior due to learning by doing. This paper provides discrete-time adjustment processes for strategic games in which players display precisely such a bias towards recent choices. In addition, players choose best replies to beliefs supported by observed play in the recent past, in line with much of the literature on learning. These processes eventually settle down in the minimal prep sets of Voorneveld (2004, 2005).
|Date of creation:||07 Mar 2005|
|Date of revision:|
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- Mark Voorneveld & Willemien Kets & Henk Norde, 2006.
"An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 153-153, April.
- Voorneveld, Mark & Kets, Willemien & Norde, Henk, 2005. "An axiomatization of minimal curb sets," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 589, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 18 Mar 2005.
- Voorneveld, M. & Kets, W. & Norde, H.W., 2005. "An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets," Discussion Paper 2005-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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"Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior,"
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2005-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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- repec:oup:restud:v:44:y:1977:i:3:p:533-47 is not listed on IDEAS
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