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An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

  • Voorneveld, Mark

    ()

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

  • Kets, Willemien

    (Department of Econometrics and Operations Research)

  • Norde, Henk

    (Department of Econometrics and Operations Research)

Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.

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Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 589.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 04 Mar 2005
Date of revision: 18 Mar 2005
Publication status: Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0589
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  1. Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.
  2. van Damme, Eric, 1998. "On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 181-210, July.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
  4. Martin Dufwenberg & Henk Norde & Hans Reijnierse & Stef Tijs, 2001. "The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 119-131, October.
  5. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-86781 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Peleg, B. & Tijs, S., 1993. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form," Papers 9306, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  7. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-72912 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Peleg, B. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1996. "Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games," Other publications TiSEM 159e2ef3-4411-4900-9bf1-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  9. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-72775 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June.
  11. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
  12. Norde, Henk & Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries, 1996. "Equilibrium Selection and Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 219-225, February.
  13. Patrone, F. & Pieri, G. & Tijs, S.H. & Torre, A., 1996. "On Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games," Research Memorandum 732, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  14. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
  15. repec:spr:compst:v:54:y:2001:i:1:p:119-131 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "Persistent retracts and preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 228-232, April.
  17. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
  18. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-72911 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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