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Unanimity Games and Pareto Optimality

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  • Ehud Kalai
  • Dov Samet

Abstract

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  • Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "Unanimity Games and Pareto Optimality," Discussion Papers 546, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:546
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/546.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 863-894.
    2. Fumio Hayashi, 1982. "The Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Consumption: A Cross-Sectional Analysis," NBER Working Papers 0882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 543-566.
    2. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Akira Okada, 1986. "A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts," Discussion Papers 706, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Chaim Fershtman, 1987. "Cooperation Through Delegation," Discussion Papers 731, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Andrew Colman & Michael Bacharach, 1997. "Payoff Dominance And The Stackelberg Heuristic," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 1-19.
    6. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1986. "Are Bayesian-Nash Incentives and Implementations Perfect?," Discussion Papers 680, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Stanford, William, 1999. "On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 29-34, January.

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