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Lies in Disguise - A Theoretical Analysis of Cheating

Author

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  • Martin Dufwenberg Jr.
  • Martin Dufwenberg

Abstract

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Dufwenberg Jr. & Martin Dufwenberg, 2016. "Lies in Disguise - A Theoretical Analysis of Cheating," CESifo Working Paper Series 6208, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6208
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6208.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Zhixin Dai & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2016. "Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field An Experiment in Public Transportations," Working Papers halshs-01265696, HAL.
    2. Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas & Wallmeier, Niklas, 2015. "Gender differences in honesty: Groups versus individuals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 25-29.
    3. Houser, Daniel & List, John A. & Piovesan, Marco & Samek, Anya & Winter, Joachim, 2016. "Dishonesty: From parents to children," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 242-254.
    4. Pascual-Ezama, David & Fosgaard, Toke R. & Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Kujal, Praveen & Veszteg, Robert & Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Beatriz & Gunia, Brian & Weichselbaumer, Doris & Hilken, Katharina & Antinyan,, 2015. "Context-dependent cheating: Experimental evidence from 16 countries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 379-386.
    5. Dieckmann, Anja & Fischbacher, Urs & Grimm, Veronika & Unfried, Matthias & Utikal, Verena & Valmasoni, Lorenzo, 2015. "Trust and beliefs among Europeans: Cross-country evidence on perceptions and behavior," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 04/2015, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    6. Navin Kartik, 2009. "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1359-1395.
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    8. Benjamin A. Olken, 2015. "Promises and Perils of Pre-analysis Plans," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 61-80, Summer.
    9. Kocher, Martin G. & Schudy, Simeon & Spantig, Lisa, 2018. "I Lie? We Lie! Why? Experimental Evidence on a Dishonesty Shift in Groups," Munich Reprints in Economics 62823, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    10. Martin G. Kocher & Simeon Schudy & Lisa Spantig, 2016. "I Lie? We Lie! Why? Experimental Evidence on a Dishonesty Shift in Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series 6008, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt & Hansen, Lars Gaarn & Piovesan, Marco, 2013. "Separating Will from Grace: An experiment on conformity and awareness in cheating," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 279-284.
    12. Kiryl Khalmetski & Dirk Sliwka, 2017. "Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 6347, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 2001. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 506-525, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Galeotti, Fabio & Kline, Reuben & Orsini, Raimondello, 2017. "When foul play seems fair: Exploring the link between just deserts and honesty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 451-467.
    2. Khalmetski, Kiryl & Rockenbach, Bettina & Werner, Peter, 2017. "Evasive lying in strategic communication," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 59-72.
    3. Garbarino, Ellen & Slonim, Robert & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2016. "Loss Aversion and Lying Behavior: Theory, Estimation and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 10395, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Cristina Bicchieri & Eugen Dimant, 2018. "It's Not A Lie If You Believe It. Lying and Belief Distortion Under Norm-Uncertainty," PPE Working Papers 0012, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    5. repec:kap:expeco:v:22:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10683-018-9584-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:eee:gamebe:v:111:y:2018:i:c:p:274-288 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    cheating; lying; costs; audience; perceived cheating aversion;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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