Disadvantageous lies in individual decisions
We present experimental evidence on the existence of lies which are disadvantageous to the person lying in individual decision problems. Potential reasons for this behavior are preferences for manipulating others’ perceptions or preserving a positive self-perception. If the utility gained from a certain perception outweighs the monetary payoff gained from an advantageous lie or the truth, people will tell a disadvantageous lie.
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