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Lying in Two Dimensions and Moral Spillovers

Author

Listed:
  • Geraldes, Diogo
  • Heinicke, Franziska
  • Rosenkranz, Stephanie

Abstract

The expanding literature on lying has exclusively considered lying behavior within a one-dimensional context. While this has been an important first step, many real-world contexts involve the possibility of simultaneously lying in more than one dimension (e.g., reporting one’s income and expenses in a tax declaration). In this paper, we experimentally investigate individual lying behavior in both one- and two-dimensional contexts to understand whether the multi-dimensionality of a decision affects lying behavior. In the one-dimensional treatment, participants are asked to roll two dice in one hand and to report the sum of both dice. In the two-dimensional treatment, participants are asked to roll two dice at the same time, but one in each hand, and to report the two dice separately. Our paper provides the first evidence regarding lying behavior in a multi-dimensional context. Using a two-dimensional die-roll task, we show that participants lie partially between dimensions, which results in greater overreporting of the lower outcome die. These findings suggest a thought-provoking policy to tackle the infamous societal challenge of tax fraud: Tax report checks should focus on the item(s) for which a taxpayer profile hints at higher self-benefits in case of misreporting.

Suggested Citation

  • Geraldes, Diogo & Heinicke, Franziska & Rosenkranz, Stephanie, 2019. "Lying in Two Dimensions and Moral Spillovers," MPRA Paper 96640, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:96640
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/96640/1/MPRA_paper_96640.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lying; honesty; morals; multidimensional; lab experiment; lab-in-the-field experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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