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Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games

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  • Aoyagi, Masaki

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  • Aoyagi, Masaki, 1996. "Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 444-469, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:70:y:1996:i:2:p:444-469
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
    2. Jordan J. S., 1993. "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 368-386, July.
    3. Lehrer, Ehud, 1988. "Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 130-144, October.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
    5. Gale, David, 1989. "The Theory of Linear Economic Models," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226278841, April.
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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 104-130, October.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
    3. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2000. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-115, January.
    4. Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 180-210, May.
    5. Spiliopoulos, Leonidas, 2013. "Beyond fictitious play beliefs: Incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 69-85.
    6. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    7. Burkhard Schipper, 2011. "Strategic Control of Myopic Best Reply in Repeated Games," Working Papers 284, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    8. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2019. "Dynamic Exploitation of Myopic Best Response," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 1143-1167, December.
    9. Spiliopoulos, Leonidas, 2012. "Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 921-935.

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