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Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria

  • Yannick Viossat

    ()

    (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - CNRS : UMR7534 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine)

If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00756096.

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Date of creation: Nov 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00756096
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00756096
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  1. Yannick Viossat, 2008. "Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria," Post-Print hal-00360756, HAL.
  2. Viossat, Yannick & Sorin, Sylvain & Hofbauer, Josef, 2009. "Time average replicator and best reply dynamics," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1014, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. A. Gaunersdorfer & J. Hofbauer, 2010. "Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons and the Replicator Equation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 438, David K. Levine.
  4. Viossat, Yannick, 2007. "The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1061, Paris Dauphine University.
  5. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
  6. Sergiu Hart, 2004. "Adaptive Heuristics," Discussion Paper Series dp372, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  7. Sandholm, William H. & Hofbauer, Josef, 2011. "Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(3), September.
  8. Yannick Viossat, 2011. "Deterministic monotone dynamics and dominated strategies," Working Papers hal-00636620, HAL.
  9. L. Samuelson & J. Zhang, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 453, David K. Levine.
  10. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
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