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Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

  • Phillip Johnson

    (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM))

  • David K. Levine

    (Department of Economics, UCLA)

  • Wolfgang Pesendorfer

    (Department of Economics, Princeton University)

In an environment of anonymous random matching, Kandori [1992] showed that with a sufficiently rich class of simple information systems the folk theorem holds. We specialize to the Prisoner's Dilemma and examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in this setting. If the benefit of future cooperation is too small, then there is no cooperation. When the benefit of cooperation is large then only cooperation will survive in the very long run.

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Paper provided by Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM in its series Working Papers with number 9805.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cie:wpaper:9805
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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M & Maskin, Eric S, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 555-73, October.
  2. S. Morris & R. Rob & H. Shin, 2010. "p-dominance and Belief Potential," Levine's Working Paper Archive 505, David K. Levine.
  3. Peyton Young & Dean Foster, 2010. "Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run," Levine's Working Paper Archive 494, David K. Levine.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1995. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Scholarly Articles 3198694, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
  6. Peyton Young, H. & Foster, Dean, 1991. "Cooperation in the long-run," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 145-156, February.
  7. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July.
  8. Dov Monderer & Dov Samet & Aner Sela, 1994. "Belief Affirming in Learning Processes," Game Theory and Information 9408002, EconWPA, revised 11 Aug 1994.
  9. Ellison, Glenn, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 567-88, July.
  10. Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew, 2009. "Learning and Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 4382413, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  12. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
  13. Michi Kandori, 2010. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Levine's Working Paper Archive 630, David K. Levine.
  14. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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