On the function of language
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00933-7
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More about this item
Keywords
Communication; Referential; Conative;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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