IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v54y2025i1d10.1007_s00182-025-00933-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the function of language

Author

Listed:
  • Joel Sobel

    (University of California, San Diego)

Abstract

This paper demonstrates how to extend a standard model of strategic communication to distinguish between referential messages that identify states and conative messages that describe actions. It assumes that there are messages that have conventional meanings and makes different assumptions about the connection between these conventional meanings and preferences. With conventional meaning and connections, differences between messages that describe states and messages that describe actions may arise in equilibrium. The nature of the relationships depends on the structure of the strategic interaction (common- versus opposed-interests). Costly lying leads to the use of referential messages in games where players have common objectives but to the use of conative messages in games where players have opposed objectives. When interests are common, players use and interpret conventional messages in the conventional way. When interests are opposed, typically there will not be an equilibrium in which players always use and interpret conventional messages in the conventional way.

Suggested Citation

  • Joel Sobel, 2025. "On the function of language," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:54:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-025-00933-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00933-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-025-00933-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00182-025-00933-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Navin Kartik, 2009. "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1359-1395.
    2. repec:cdl:ucsdec:qt0015j574 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Suzuki, Toru, 2017. "Directives, expressives, and motivation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    4. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
    5. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
    6. Suzuki, Toru, 2020. "Efficient communication and indexicality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 156-165.
    7. Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2019. "Preferences for Truth‐Telling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1115-1153, July.
    8. Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2013. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1325-1359, June.
    9. Green, Jerry R. & Stokey, Nancy L., 2007. "A two-person game of information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 90-104, July.
    10. Joel Sobel, 2020. "Lying and Deception in Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(3), pages 907-947.
    11. Steven Callander & Nicolas S. Lambert & Niko Matouschek, 2021. "The Power of Referential Advice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(11), pages 3073-3140.
    12. Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
    13. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    14. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
    15. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2023. "Mediated talk: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:cdl:ucsdec:qt3tb9m070 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
    3. Luca Braghieri, 2023. "Biased Decoding and the Foundations of Communication," CESifo Working Paper Series 10432, CESifo.
    4. Giovannoni, Francesco & Xiong, Siyang, 2019. "Communication under language barriers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 274-303.
    5. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
    6. Daniel H. Wood, 2022. "Communication-Enhancing Vagueness," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-27, June.
    7. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
    8. Gesche, Tobias, 2021. "De-biasing strategic communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 452-464.
    9. Lafky, Jonathan & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2022. "Preferences vs. strategic thinking: An investigation of the causes of overcommunication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 92-116.
    10. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    11. Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
    12. Siyu Wang & Timothy Flannery, 2021. "Intention or Request: The Impact of Message Structures," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-13, February.
    13. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2021. "Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 867-889, December.
    14. Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Randolph Sloof, 2016. "Communication versus (Restricted) Delegation: An Experimental Comparison," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-050/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    15. Edoardo Grillo, 2014. "Reference Dependence and Politicians' Credibility," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 353, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    16. Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & D'Agostino, Elena & Pavesi, Filippo, 2023. "Watch your words: An experimental study on communication and the opportunity cost of delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 216-232.
    17. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    18. Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)," Discussion Paper 2010-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    19. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 31-53, January.
    20. Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2024. "Cheap talk with two-sided private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 97-118.
    21. Au, Pak Hung & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhang, Jipeng, 2022. "In vino veritas? Communication under the influence—An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 325-340.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:54:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-025-00933-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.