IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v150y2025icp106-130.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets

Author

Listed:
  • Doval, Laura
  • Szentes, Balázs

Abstract

We study a two-sided dynamic matching market where agents arrive randomly. An arriving agent is immediately matched if agents are waiting on the other side. Otherwise, the agent decides whether to exit the market or join a queue to wait for a match. Waiting is costly: agents discount the future and incur costs while they wait. We characterize the equilibrium and socially optimal queue sizes under first-come, first-served. Depending on the model parameters, equilibrium queues can be shorter or longer than efficiency would require them to be. Indeed, socially optimal queues may be unbounded, even if equilibrium queues are not. By contrast, when agents only incur flow costs while they wait, equilibrium queues are typically longer than socially optimal ones (cf. Baccara et al., 2020). Unlike one-sided markets, the comparison between equilibrium and socially optimal queues in two-sided markets depends on agents' time preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Doval, Laura & Szentes, Balázs, 2025. "On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 106-130.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:106-130
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.019
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001817
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.019?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel Waldinger, 2021. "Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(8), pages 2660-2696, August.
    2. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    3. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2020. "Optimal dynamic matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    4. Schummer, James, 2021. "Influencing waiting lists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    5. Nikhil Agarwal & Itai Ashlagi & Michael A. Rees & Paulo Somaini & Daniel Waldinger, 2021. "Equilibrium Allocations Under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence From Deceased Donor Kidneys," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(1), pages 37-76, January.
    6. Naor, P, 1969. "The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(1), pages 15-24, January.
    7. Itai Ashlagi & Maximilien Burq & Patrick Jaillet & Vahideh Manshadi, 2019. "On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(4), pages 927-949, July.
    8. Shi, Ying & Lian, Zhaotong, 2016. "Optimization and strategic behavior in a passenger–taxi service system," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 249(3), pages 1024-1032.
    9. Ivo Adan & Gideon Weiss, 2012. "Exact FCFS Matching Rates for Two Infinite Multitype Sequences," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(2), pages 475-489, April.
    10. James M. Dobbie, 1961. "Letter to the Editor---A Doubled-Ended Queuing Problem of Kendall," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 9(5), pages 755-757, October.
    11. Ingrid Huitfeldt & Victoria Marone & Daniel C. Waldinger, 2024. "Designing Dynamic Reassignment Mechanisms: Evidence from GP Allocation," NBER Working Papers 32458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Afshin Nikzad & Philipp Strack, 2024. "Equity and Efficiency in Dynamic Matching: Extreme Waitlist Policies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(8), pages 5187-5207, August.
    13. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 667-680, May.
    14. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li & Shayan Oveis Gharan, 2020. "Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(3), pages 783-815.
    15. Canice Prendergast & Lars Stole, 2001. "Barter, Liquidity and Market Segmentation," CESifo Working Paper Series 586, CESifo.
    16. Jacob D. Leshno, 2022. "Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(12), pages 3876-3910, December.
    17. Shimer Robert & Smith Lones, 2001. "Matching, Search, and Heterogeneity," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, April.
    18. Wang, Jinting & Zhang, Xuelu & Huang, Ping, 2017. "Strategic behavior and social optimization in a constant retrial queue with the N-policy," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(3), pages 841-849.
    19. Hassin, Refael, 1985. "On the Optimality of First Come Last Served Queues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 201-202, January.
    20. Philipp Afèche & Adam Diamant & Joseph Milner, 2014. "Double-Sided Batch Queues with Abandonment: Modeling Crossing Networks," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(5), pages 1179-1201, October.
    21. Lindsay, Cotton M & Feigenbaum, Bernard, 1984. "Rationing by Waiting Lists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 404-417, June.
    22. Colin E. Bell, 1971. "Characterization and Computation of Optimal Policies for Operating an M / G /1 Queuing System with Removable Server," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 19(1), pages 208-218, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier & Vahideh Manshadi & Alexander Wei, 2023. "Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4609-4626, August.
    2. Chai, Xudong & Jiang, Tao & Chang, Baoxian & Liu, Liwei, 2021. "On a multiple priorities matching system with heterogeneous delay sensitive individuals," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 395(C).
    3. Schummer, James, 2021. "Influencing waiting lists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    4. Mertikopoulos, Panayotis & Nax, Heinrich H. & Pradelski, Bary S.R., 2024. "Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    5. Yang, Qiaoli & Qiao, Zheng & Yang, Bo & Shi, Zhongke, 2021. "Modeling and uncovering the passenger–taxi dynamic queues at taxi station with multiple boarding points using a Markovian environment," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 572(C).
    6. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Eray Cumbul, 2025. "Waitlist engineering in discrete object allocations with outside option," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(1), pages 1-22, June.
    7. Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen, 2001. "The Parking Lot Problem," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-119, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
      • Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen, 2007. "The Parking Lot Problem," Working Papers 2007-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    8. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2023. "Task allocation and on-the-job training," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    9. Lingbo Huang & Tracy Xiao Liu & Jun Zhang, 2023. "Born to wait? A study on allocation rules in booking systems," Discussion Papers 2023-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    10. Süleyman Kerimov & Itai Ashlagi & Itai Gurvich, 2024. "Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 2799-2822, May.
    11. Yang, Qiaoli & Yang, Bo & Qiao, Zheng & Tang, Min-an & Gao, Fengyang, 2021. "Impact of possible random factors on queue behaviors of passengers and taxis at taxi stand of transport hubs," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 580(C).
    12. Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & Vahideh Manshadi, 2023. "Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(7), pages 3778-3796, July.
    13. Wen, Shang-Wu & Tang, Tie-Qiao & Zhang, Jian & Qin, Meng-Xin & Huang, Hai-Jun, 2025. "Information-based taxi-passenger matching management in transportation hubs: A double-ended queuing perspective," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    14. Hung Q. Nguyen & Tuan Phung-Duc, 2022. "Strategic customer behavior and optimal policies in a passenger–taxi double-ended queueing system with multiple access points and nonzero matching times," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 102(3), pages 481-508, December.
    15. Irene Lo & Vahideh Manshadi & Scott Rodilitz & Ali Shameli, 2020. "Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement," Papers 2005.10731, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    16. Maxey, Tyler, 2023. "Dynamic matching with transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    17. Chai, Xudong & Liu, Liwei & Chang, Baoxian & Jiang, Tao & Wang, Zhen, 2019. "On a batch matching system with impatient servers and boundedly rational customers," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 354(C), pages 308-328.
    18. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2020. "Optimal dynamic matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    19. Gideon Weiss, 2020. "Directed FCFS infinite bipartite matching," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 96(3), pages 387-418, December.
    20. Lei, Xiaochang, 2023. "Optimal queue to minimize waste," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 87-94.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic matching; Queueing; Two-sided markets; Efficiency; Discounting; Flow costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:106-130. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.