IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/29312.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Task Allocation and On-the-job Training

Author

Listed:
  • Mariagiovanna Baccara
  • SangMok Lee
  • Leeat Yariv

Abstract

We study dynamic task allocation when providers' expertise evolves endogenously through training. We characterize optimal assignment protocols and compare them to discretionary procedures, where it is the clients who select their service providers. Our results indicate that welfare gains from centralization are greater when tasks arrive more rapidly, and when training technologies improve. Monitoring seniors' backlog of clients always increases welfare but may decrease training. Methodologically, we explore a matching setting with endogenous types, and illustrate useful adaptations of queueing theory techniques for such environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariagiovanna Baccara & SangMok Lee & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Task Allocation and On-the-job Training," NBER Working Papers 29312, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29312
    Note: IO LS PR
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w29312.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Drew Fudenberg & Luis Rayo, 2019. "Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(11), pages 3780-3812, November.
    2. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2020. "Optimal dynamic matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1999. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 539-572, June.
    4. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2017. "Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 88-122, February.
    5. Daron Acemoglu, 1997. "Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 445-464.
    6. Alessandro Lizzeri & Marciano Siniscalchi, 2008. "Parental Guidance and Supervised Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(3), pages 1161-1195.
    7. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2017. "Relational Knowledge Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(9), pages 2695-2730, September.
    8. Robert L. Bray & Decio Coviello & Andrea Ichino & Nicola Persico, 2016. "Multitasking, Multiarmed Bandits, and the Italian Judiciary," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 18(4), pages 545-558, October.
    9. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2021. "Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(637), pages 1905-1918.
    10. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
    11. Pietro Ortoleva & Evgenii Safonov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities," Working Papers 2021-10, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    12. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2017. "Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03968341, HAL.
    13. Decio Coviello & Andrea Ichino & Nicola Persico, 2014. "Time Allocation and Task Juggling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(2), pages 609-623, February.
    14. Alessandro Gavazza & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2007. "The Perils of Transparency in Bureaucracies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 300-305, May.
    15. Jacob D. Leshno, 2022. "Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(12), pages 3876-3910, December.
    16. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li & Shayan Oveis Gharan, 2020. "Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(3), pages 783-815.
    17. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2017. "Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents," Post-Print halshs-03968341, HAL.
    18. Chari, V V & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 1991. "Vintage Human Capital, Growth, and the Diffusion of New Technology," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1142-1165, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Konstantin Samouylov & Olga Dudina & Alexander Dudin, 2023. "Analysis of Multi-Server Queueing System with Flexible Priorities," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-22, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Maxey, Tyler, 2023. "Dynamic matching with transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    2. Schummer, James, 2021. "Influencing waiting lists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    3. Lei, Xiaochang, 2023. "Optimal queue to minimize waste," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 87-94.
    4. Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5455-5478, September.
    5. Santiago Caicedo & Arthur Seibold & Miguel Espinosa, 2019. "The Effects of Mandating Training in Firms: Theory and Evidence from the Colombian Apprenticeship Program," 2019 Meeting Papers 888, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2017. "Relational Knowledge Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(9), pages 2695-2730, September.
    7. Fudenberg, Drew & Georgiadis, George & Rayo, Luis, 2021. "Working to learn," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    8. Mertikopoulos, Panayotis & Nax, Heinrich H. & Pradelski, Bary S.R., 2024. "Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    9. Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2023. "When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1145-1173, November.
    10. Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2003. "General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 197-227, April.
    11. Naoki Shintoyo, 2008. "Creation of jobs and firm-sponsored training in a matching model of unemployment," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 145-176, March.
    12. Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2006. "The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: on the Interaction of General and Specific Investments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 903-923, October.
    13. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jorn-Steffen, 1999. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 112-142, February.
    14. Christopher Flinn & Ahu Gemici & Steven Laufer, 2017. "Search, Matching, and Training," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 25, pages 260-297, April.
    15. Bratti, Massimiliano & Conti, Maurizio & Sulis, Giovanni, 2018. "Employment Protection, Temporary Contracts and Firm-Provided Training: Evidence from Italy," IZA Discussion Papers 11339, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Pedro S. Martins & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2023. "Employers’ associations, worker mobility, and training," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp653, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    17. Gneezy, Uri & Nelidov, Vadim & Offerman, Theo & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2023. "When opportunities backfire: Alternatives reduce perseverance and success in task completion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 304-324.
    18. Veronica Rattini, 2023. "Worker autonomy and performance: Evidence from a real‐effort experiment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 300-327, April.
    19. Ma, Xiao & Muendler, Marc-Andreas & Nakab, Alejandro, 2020. "Learning by Exporting and Wage Profiles: New Evidence from Brazil," MPRA Paper 109497, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Aug 2021.
    20. Daron Acemoglu, 2003. "Cross-Country Inequality Trends," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(485), pages 121-149, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.