IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pdo381.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Laura Doval

Personal Details

First Name:Laura
Middle Name:
Last Name:Doval
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pdo381
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www.laura-doval.com
1200 E California Blvd MC 228-77 Pasadena, CA 91125
Terminal Degree:2016 Department of Economics; Northwestern University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Division of Social Sciences
California Institute of Technology

Pasadena, California (United States)
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/research/social-sciences-research
RePEc:edi:dscalus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Laura Doval & Ran Eilat, 2023. "The Core of Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2307.13849, arXiv.org.
  2. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2021. "Purchase history and product personalization," Papers 2103.11504, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
  4. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2021. "Persuasion and Welfare," Papers 2109.03061, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
  5. Nicholas Buchholz & Laura Doval & Jakub Kastl & Filip Matějka & Tobias Salz, 2020. "Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence from Auctioned Cab Rides," NBER Working Papers 27087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Kastl, Jakub & Buchholz, Nicholas & Doval, Laura & Matějka, Filip & Salz, Tobias, 2020. "The Value of Time: Evidence From Auctioned Cab Rides," CEPR Discussion Papers 14666, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
  8. Laura Doval, 2019. "Dynamically Stable Matching," Papers 1906.11391, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
  9. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
  10. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Constrained Information Design," Papers 1811.03588, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
  11. Laura Doval, 2014. "Whether or not to open Pandora's box," Discussion Papers 1574, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Doval, Laura, 2022. "Dynamically stable matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  2. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
  3. Laura Doval & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2020. "Sequential Information Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2575-2608, November.
  4. Doval, Laura, 2018. "Whether or not to open Pandora's box," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 127-158.
  5. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 0. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2022. "Data Collection by an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2023. "Data Provision to an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  2. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2021. "Purchase history and product personalization," Papers 2103.11504, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.

    Cited by:

    1. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.

  3. Nicholas Buchholz & Laura Doval & Jakub Kastl & Filip Matějka & Tobias Salz, 2020. "Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence from Auctioned Cab Rides," NBER Working Papers 27087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Jullien, Bruno & Pavan, Alessandro & Rysman, Marc, 2021. "Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects," TSE Working Papers 21-1238, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Tarduno, Matthew, 2021. "The congestion costs of Uber and Lyft," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    3. Christian Krekel & George MacKerron, 2023. "Back to Edgeworth? Estimating the value of time using hedonic experiences," CEP Discussion Papers dp1932, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    4. Bencsik, Panka & Lusher, Lester & Taylor, Rebecca L.C., 2023. "Slow Traffic, Fast Food: The Effects of Time Lost on Food Store Choice," IZA Discussion Papers 16036, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Zhang, Yuhan & Shao, Yichang & Bi, Hui & Aoyong, Li & Ye, Zhirui, 2023. "Bike-sharing systems rebalancing considering redistribution proportions: A user-based repositioning approach," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 610(C).
    6. Goldszmidt, Ariel & List, John A. & Metcalfe, Robert D. & Muir, Ian & Smith, V. Kerry & Wang, Jenny, 2020. "The Value of Time in the United States: Estimates from Nationwide Natural Field Experiments," RFF Working Paper Series 20-23, Resources for the Future.
    7. Lam, Chungsang Tom & Liu, Meng & Hui, Xiang, 2021. "The geography of ridesharing: A case study on New York City," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    8. Christensen, Peter & Osman, Adam, 2021. "The Demand for Mobility: Evidence from an Experiment with Uber Riders," IZA Discussion Papers 14179, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Durrmeyer, Isis & Martinez, Nicolas, 2022. "The Welfare Consequences of Urban Traffic Regulations," TSE Working Papers 22-1378, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. Su, Yichen, 2022. "Measuring the Value of Urban Consumption Amenities: A Time-Use Approach," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    11. Gilles Duranton & Jessie Handbury, 2023. "Covid and Cities, Thus Far," NBER Working Papers 31158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Enache, Andreea & Friberg, Richard & Wiklander, Magnus, 2023. "Demand for in-app purchases in mobile apps—A difference-in-difference approach," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    13. Su, Yichen, 2022. "Measuring the Value of Urban Consumption Amenities: A Time-Use Approach," MPRA Paper 113158, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Wichman, Casey J. & Cunningham, Brandon, 2023. "Notching for free: Do cyclists reveal the opportunity cost of time?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).

  4. Kastl, Jakub & Buchholz, Nicholas & Doval, Laura & Matějka, Filip & Salz, Tobias, 2020. "The Value of Time: Evidence From Auctioned Cab Rides," CEPR Discussion Papers 14666, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Jullien, Bruno & Pavan, Alessandro & Rysman, Marc, 2021. "Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects," TSE Working Papers 21-1238, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Tarduno, Matthew, 2021. "The congestion costs of Uber and Lyft," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    3. Kastl, Jakub & Buchholz, Nicholas & Doval, Laura & Matějka, Filip & Salz, Tobias, 2020. "The Value of Time: Evidence From Auctioned Cab Rides," CEPR Discussion Papers 14666, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Christian Krekel & George MacKerron, 2023. "Back to Edgeworth? Estimating the value of time using hedonic experiences," CEP Discussion Papers dp1932, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    5. Bencsik, Panka & Lusher, Lester & Taylor, Rebecca L.C., 2023. "Slow Traffic, Fast Food: The Effects of Time Lost on Food Store Choice," IZA Discussion Papers 16036, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Zhang, Yuhan & Shao, Yichang & Bi, Hui & Aoyong, Li & Ye, Zhirui, 2023. "Bike-sharing systems rebalancing considering redistribution proportions: A user-based repositioning approach," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 610(C).
    7. Goldszmidt, Ariel & List, John A. & Metcalfe, Robert D. & Muir, Ian & Smith, V. Kerry & Wang, Jenny, 2020. "The Value of Time in the United States: Estimates from Nationwide Natural Field Experiments," RFF Working Paper Series 20-23, Resources for the Future.
    8. Lam, Chungsang Tom & Liu, Meng & Hui, Xiang, 2021. "The geography of ridesharing: A case study on New York City," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    9. Christensen, Peter & Osman, Adam, 2021. "The Demand for Mobility: Evidence from an Experiment with Uber Riders," IZA Discussion Papers 14179, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Durrmeyer, Isis & Martinez, Nicolas, 2022. "The Welfare Consequences of Urban Traffic Regulations," TSE Working Papers 22-1378, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    11. Su, Yichen, 2022. "Measuring the Value of Urban Consumption Amenities: A Time-Use Approach," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    12. Gilles Duranton & Jessie Handbury, 2023. "Covid and Cities, Thus Far," NBER Working Papers 31158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Enache, Andreea & Friberg, Richard & Wiklander, Magnus, 2023. "Demand for in-app purchases in mobile apps—A difference-in-difference approach," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    14. Su, Yichen, 2022. "Measuring the Value of Urban Consumption Amenities: A Time-Use Approach," MPRA Paper 113158, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Wichman, Casey J. & Cunningham, Brandon, 2023. "Notching for free: Do cyclists reveal the opportunity cost of time?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).

  5. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.

    Cited by:

    1. Juan Beccuti & Marc Moeller, 2019. "Screening by Mode of Trade," Diskussionsschriften dp1908, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    2. Juan Beccuti, 2020. "On the Optimality of Price-posting in Rental Markets," Diskussionsschriften dp2007, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    3. Quitz'e Valenzuela-Stookey, 2020. "Screening and Information-Sharing Externalities," Papers 2011.04013, arXiv.org.
    4. S. Nageeb Ali & Navin Kartik & Andreas Kleiner, 2022. "Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Papers 2202.02462, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    5. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022. "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    6. Martino Banchio & Frank Yang, 2021. "Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment," Papers 2102.07742, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    7. Francesco Giovannoni & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2022. "Pricing Novel Goods," Papers 2208.04985, arXiv.org.
    8. Antoniou, Fabio & Fiocco, Raffaele, 2020. "Storable good market with intertemporal cost variations," MPRA Paper 97948, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  6. Laura Doval, 2019. "Dynamically Stable Matching," Papers 1906.11391, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.

    Cited by:

    1. Marco LiCalzi, 2022. "Bipartite choices," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 45(2), pages 551-568, December.
    2. Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018. "When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 18/704, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    3. Davi B. Costa, 2021. "Benefits of marriage as a search strategy," Papers 2108.04885, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
    4. Shi, Fanqi, 2021. "Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 492-502.

  7. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.

    Cited by:

    1. Juan Beccuti & Marc Moeller, 2019. "Screening by Mode of Trade," Diskussionsschriften dp1908, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    2. Juan Beccuti, 2020. "On the Optimality of Price-posting in Rental Markets," Diskussionsschriften dp2007, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    3. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2023. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Papers 2309.11595, arXiv.org.
    4. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2023. "Persuasion and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 18104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2021. "Purchase history and product personalization," Papers 2103.11504, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    6. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    7. Breig, Zachary, 2022. "Repeated contracting without commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    8. Johannes Abeler & David Huffman & Colin Raymond, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," Economics Series Working Papers 1012, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    9. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-05, McMaster University.
    10. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Constrained Information Design," Papers 1811.03588, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    11. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Abeler, Johannes & Huffman, David B. & Raymond, Collin, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 16284, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Maryam Saeedi & Ali Shourideh, 2020. "Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard," Papers 2008.09529, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    14. Tangerås, Thomas & Gick, Wolfgang, 2021. "Contracting with Endogenously Incomplete Commitment: Escape Clauses," Working Paper Series 1390, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

  8. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Constrained Information Design," Papers 1811.03588, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.

    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Corrao & Yifan Dai, 2023. "The Bounds of Mediated Communication," Papers 2303.06244, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    2. Onuchic, Paula & Ray, Debraj, 2023. "Conveying value via categories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
    3. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    4. George Georgiadis & Balazs Szentes, 2020. "Optimal Monitoring Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2075-2107, September.
    5. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    6. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2022. "The comparative statics of persuasion," Papers 2204.07474, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    7. Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    8. Mark Whitmeyer, 2019. "Bayesian Elicitation," Papers 1902.00976, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    9. Yaron Azrieli, 2021. "Constrained versus Unconstrained Rational Inattention," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, January.
    10. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
    11. Piotr Dworczak & Anton Kolotilin, 2019. "The Persuasion Duality," Papers 1910.11392, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.

  9. Laura Doval, 2014. "Whether or not to open Pandora's box," Discussion Papers 1574, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Armstrong, Mark, 2016. "Ordered Consumer Search," CEPR Discussion Papers 11566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2013. "Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2013-003, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    3. Liang Guo, 2021. "Endogenous Evaluation and Sequential Search," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(3), pages 413-427, May.
    4. Julien Grenet & YingHua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(6), pages 1427-1476.
    5. Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2018. "Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets," Papers 1802.09396, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    6. Hedyeh Beyhaghi & Linda Cai, 2023. "Recent Developments in Pandora's Box Problem: Variants and Applications," Papers 2308.12242, arXiv.org.
    7. Noda, Shunya, 2022. "Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 115-125.
    8. Ke, T. Tony & Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, 2019. "Optimal learning before choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 383-437.
    9. Manuel Mueller-Frank & Mallesh M. Pai, 2016. "Social Learning with Costly Search," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 83-109, February.
    10. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea & Pan, Siqi, 2021. "Costly Information Acquisition in Centralized Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 280, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    11. Li, Yunan, 2020. "Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    12. Grenet, Julien & He, Yinghua & Kübler, Dorothea, 2019. "Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets: Implications From Early Offers in University Admissions," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 158, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    13. Greminger, Rafael, 2019. "Optimal Search and Awareness Expansion," Other publications TiSEM ac47e6ff-42a4-4d70-addd-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Weijie Zhong, 2022. "Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1537-1582, July.
    15. T. Tony Ke & Song Lin, 2020. "Informational Complementarity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3699-3716, August.
    16. Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2021. "Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    17. Efthymios Lykopoulos & Georgios Voucharas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022. "Pandora’s rules in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1492-1514, November.
    18. Rafael P. Greminger, 2019. "Optimal Search and Discovery," Papers 1911.07773, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    19. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    20. Geoffrey A. Chua & Gaoji Hu & Fang Liu, 2023. "Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 455-488, October.
    21. Chen, Yanbin & Li, Sanxi & Lin, Kai & Yu, Jun, 2021. "Consumer search with blind buying," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 402-427.
    22. Petrikaitė, Vaiva, 2022. "Escaping search when buying," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    23. Rafael P. Greminger, 2022. "Optimal Search and Discovery," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3904-3924, May.
    24. Minghua Chen & Konstantinos Serfes & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2023. "Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 1-31, March.
    25. Greminger, Rafael, 2019. "Optimal Search and Awareness Expansion," Discussion Paper 2019-034, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    26. Christoph Carnehl & Johannes Schneider, 2021. "On Risk and Time Pressure: When to Think and When to Do," Papers 2111.07451, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
    27. Yunan Li, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Costly Verification and Limited Punishments, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Sep 2017.
    28. Agastya, Murali & Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).

Articles

  1. Doval, Laura, 2022. "Dynamically stable matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Laura Doval & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2020. "Sequential Information Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2575-2608, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar & Jorge Bruno & Sonali SenGupta, 2022. "A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty," Papers 2210.08328, arXiv.org.
    2. Noda, Shunya, 2022. "Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 115-125.
    3. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02400053, HAL.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Search, Information, and Prices," Working Papers 2020-23, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    5. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0030, Berlin School of Economics.
    6. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
    7. Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar & Jorge Bruno & Renaud Foucart & Sonali Sen Gupta, 2023. "Efficient Public Good Provision in a Multipolar World," Working Papers 377534420, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    8. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    9. Anwar, Sakib & Bruno, Jorge & SenGupta, Sonali, 2022. "A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty," QBS Working Paper Series 2022/07, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
    10. Jann, Ole & Schottmüller, Christoph, 2021. "Regime change games with an active defender," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 96-113.
    11. Hiroto Sato, 2023. "Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 269-285, June.
    12. Nasimeh Heydaribeni & Ketan Savla, 2021. "Information Design for a Non-atomic Service Scheduling Game," Papers 2110.00090, arXiv.org.

  4. Doval, Laura, 2018. "Whether or not to open Pandora's box," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 127-158.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 0. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 12 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (8) 2018-11-19 2019-04-22 2019-07-15 2019-10-21 2021-04-05 2021-05-10 2021-09-20 2023-08-28. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (6) 2018-11-19 2019-04-22 2019-07-15 2019-10-21 2021-09-20 2023-08-28. Author is listed
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2019-10-21 2021-04-05 2021-05-10
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2019-10-21 2021-09-20 2023-08-28
  5. NEP-PAY: Payment Systems and Financial Technology (3) 2020-05-25 2020-07-13 2022-11-07
  6. NEP-TRE: Transport Economics (3) 2020-05-25 2020-07-13 2022-11-07
  7. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (3) 2020-05-25 2020-07-13 2022-11-07
  8. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (2) 2021-09-20 2021-09-20
  9. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2021-05-10
  10. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages (1) 2020-05-25
  11. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2019-10-21

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Laura Doval should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.