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When Can Communication Lead to Efficiency?

Author

Listed:
  • Itai Arieli
  • Yakov Babichenko
  • Atulya Jain
  • Rann Smorodinsky

Abstract

We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. We show that any outcome with excessive randomization over actions is inefficient. Generically, efficiency requires that the total number of actions taken across states be strictly less than the sum of the number of players and states. We then examine the efficiency of equilibrium outcomes in communication models. Generically, a cheap talk outcome is efficient only if it is pure. When the sender's payoff is state-independent, it is efficient if and only if the sender's most preferred action is chosen with certainty. In natural buyer-seller settings, Bayesian persuasion outcomes are inefficient across a wide range of priors and preferences. Finally, we show that our results apply to mechanism design problems with many players.

Suggested Citation

  • Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Atulya Jain & Rann Smorodinsky, 2025. "When Can Communication Lead to Efficiency?," Papers 2510.12508, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2510.12508
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.12508
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