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Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives

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Listed:
  • Jan-Henrik Steg
  • Elshan Garashli
  • Michael Greinecker
  • Christoph Kuzmics

Abstract

For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are robust, but the sender-optimum is always achieved at some robust equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan-Henrik Steg & Elshan Garashli & Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics, 2023. "Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives," Papers 2309.04193, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2309.04193
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2309.04193
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
      • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
    2. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2020. "Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1631-1660, July.
    3. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    4. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
    5. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, December.
    6. Christoph Diehl & Christoph Kuzmics, 2021. "The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-925, December.
    7. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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