The Persuasion Duality
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- Dworczak, Piotr & Kolotilin, Anton, 0. "The persuasion duality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
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- Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "Assortative Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers 2020-08, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Zeng, Yishu, 2023. "Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
- Smolin, Alex & Yamashita, Takuro, 2022.
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- Takuro Yamashita & Alexey Smolin, 2022. "Information design in concave games," Post-Print hal-04141179, HAL.
- Yamashita, Takuro & Smolin, Alex, 2022. "Information Design in Concave Games," TSE Working Papers 22-1313, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Alex Smolin & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Information Design in Smooth Games," Papers 2202.10883, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2019-11-04 (Microeconomics)
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