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Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching

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  • Anton Kolotilin
  • Alexander Wolitzky

Abstract

We offer a simple analysis of the problem of choosing a statistical experiment to optimize the induced distribution of posterior medians, or more generally $q$-quantiles for any $q \in (0,1)$. We show that all implementable distributions of the posterior $q$-quantile are implemented by a single experiment, the $q$-quantile matching experiment, which pools pairs of states across the $q$-quantile of the prior in a positively assortative manner, with weight $q$ on the lower state in each pair. A dense subset of implementable distributions of posterior $q$-quantiles can be uniquely implemented by perturbing the $q$-quantile matching experiment. A linear functional is optimized over distributions of posterior $q$-quantiles by taking the optimal selection from each set of $q$-quantiles induced by the $q$-quantile matching experiment. The $q$-quantile matching experiment is the only experiment that simultaneously implements all implementable distributions of the posterior $q$-quantile.

Suggested Citation

  • Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky, 2024. "Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching," Papers 2402.17142, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2402.17142
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    2. Dworczak, Piotr & Kolotilin, Anton, 2024. "The persuasion duality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(4), November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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