Report NEP-DES-2019-04-22

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Klemperer, Paul, 2019, "Product-Mix Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13667, Apr.
• Maris Goldmanis & Francesco Decarolis & Antonio Penta, 2019, "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1088, Apr.
• Cary Deck & Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker, 2019, "Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best?," Working Papers in Economics, University of Waikato, number 19/04, Apr.
• Jääskeläinen, Jan & Tukiainen, Janne, 2019, "Anatomy of public procurement," Working Papers, VATT Institute for Economic Research, number 118.
• M. Derksen & B. Kleijn & R. de Vilder, 2019, "Clearing price distributions in call auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1904.07583, Apr, revised Nov 2019.
• Graddy, Kathryn & Ashenfelter, Orley C, 2019, "Art Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13665, Apr.
• Agustín G. Bonifacio & Jordi Massó, 2019, "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 965.19, Apr.
• Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019, "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1904.07456, Apr, revised May 2021.
• Aperjis, Christina & Kotowski, Maciej & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2019, "Efficient Division When Preferences are Private: Using the Expected Externality Mechanism," Working Paper Series, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, number rwp19-014, Apr.
• Sylvain Béal & André Casajus & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2019, "Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: Two extensions of the Shapley value," Working Papers, CRESE, number 2019-03, Apr.
• Item repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_080 is not listed on IDEAS anymore

Report NEP-DES-2019-04-22

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report: