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Information agreements

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  • Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç
  • Samsonov, Arseniy

Abstract

We define a (cooperative) informational bargaining problem, where several agents have to agree on the persuasion of a receiver. The bargaining set includes payoff vectors that can be generated by information structures and disagreement leads to an exogenous benchmark that may involve full or no information. We characterize the existence of an agreement that benefits all agents when preferences are state-independent. Our characterization yields conditions that depend only on the payoff structure but are independent of the prior beliefs in some cases. We analyze Pareto efficient information structures in two applications: selection environments, where the receiver picks the best agent, and the bargaining between a retailer platform and a regulator on consumer privacy regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç & Samsonov, Arseniy, 2025. "Information agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:229:y:2025:i:c:s0022053125001140
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106068
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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