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Algorithmic Delegated Choice: An Annotated Reading List

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  • Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi
  • Suho Shin

Abstract

The problem of delegated choice has been of long interest in economics and recently on computer science. We overview a list of papers on delegated choice problem, from classic works to recent papers with algorithmic perspectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi & Suho Shin, 2025. "Algorithmic Delegated Choice: An Annotated Reading List," Papers 2508.06562, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2508.06562
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2010. "A Model of Delegated Project Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 213-244, January.
    2. Weitzman, Martin L, 1979. "Optimal Search for the Best Alternative," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 641-654, May.
    3. Doval, Laura, 2018. "Whether or not to open Pandora's box," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 127-158.
    4. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer.
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