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Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation

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  • Daniel Waldinger

Abstract

Public housing benefits are rationed through wait lists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying a possible trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. This paper empirically establishes the existence and economic importance of this trade-off using wait list data from Cambridge, Massachusetts. I estimate a model of public housing preferences in a setting where heterogeneous apartments are rationed through waiting time. Eliminating choice would improve targeting but reduce tenant welfare by more than 30 percent. Such a change is only justified on targeting grounds by a strong social preference for redistribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Waldinger, 2021. "Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(8), pages 2660-2696, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:8:p:2660-96
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190516
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian A. L. Hilber & Olivier Schoni, 2022. "Housing policy and affordable housing," CEP Occasional Papers 56, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Nikhil Agarwal & Eric Budish, 2021. "Market Design," NBER Working Papers 29367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Zi Yang Kang & Mitchell Watt, 2024. "Optimal In-Kind Redistribution," Papers 2409.06112, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    4. Mariana Laverde & Elton Mykerezi & Aaron Sojourner & Aradhya Sood, 2023. "Gains from Reassignment: Evidence from A Two-Sided Teacher Market," Upjohn Working Papers 23-392, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    5. Rilinger, Georg, 2021. "The organizational roots of market design failure structural abstraction, the limits of hierarchy, and the California energy crisis of 2000/01," MPIfG Discussion Paper 21/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    6. Takanori Ida & Takunori Ishihara & Koichiro Ito & Daido Kido & Toru Kitagawa & Shosei Sakaguchi & Shusaku Sasaki, 2022. "Choosing Who Chooses: Selection-Driven Targeting in Energy Rebate Programs," NBER Working Papers 30469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Maximilian Kasy & Alexander Teytelboym, 2023. "Matching with semi-bandits," The Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 26(1), pages 45-66.
    8. Ellen, Ingrid Gould & O’Regan, Katherine & Strochak, Sarah, 2024. "Race, Space, and Take Up: Explaining housing voucher lease-up rates," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Takanori Ida & Takunori Ishihara & Koichiro Ito & Daido Kido & Toru Kitagawa & Shosei Sakaguchi & Shusaku Sasaki, 2021. "Paternalism, Autonomy, or Both? Experimental Evidence from Energy Saving Programs," Papers 2112.09850, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

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