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Content
2022, Volume 136, Issue C
- 142-152 The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
by Norman, Thomas W.L.
- 153-176 Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers
by Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol
- 177-196 Public communication with externalities
by Lukyanov, Georgy & Shamruk, Konstantin & Su, Tong & Wakrim, Ahmed
- 197-225 Issue selection, media competition, and polarization of salience
by Yamaguchi, Yohei
- 226-248 Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
by Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin
- 249-254 The bargaining trap
by Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
- 255-273 Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect
by Babaioff, Moshe & Dobzinski, Shahar & Oren, Sigal
- 274-298 On reward sharing in blockchain mining pools
by Can, Burak & Leth Hougaard, Jens & Pourpouneh, Mohsen
- 299-324 Reciprocity with uncertainty about others
by Sohn, Jin-yeong & Wu, Wenhao
- 325-339 Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism
by Naono, Miharu
- 340-359 Link investment substitutability: A factor influencing network formation
by Ding, Sihua
- 360-378 Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis
by Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T. & Riener, Gerhard
- 379-388 The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise
by Silva, Francisco
- 389-402 Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
by Matsushima, Hitoshi
- 403-427 Leading to efficient coordination: Individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game
by Feri, Francesco & Gantner, Anita & Moffatt, Peter G. & Erharter, Dominik
- 428-453 Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market
by Biró, Péter & Klijn, Flip & Pápai, Szilvia
- 454-468 The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
by Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Våge Knutsen, Magnus
- 469-484 Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
by Domènech, Gerard & Núñez, Marina
- 485-504 Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
by Chen, Yi-Chun & Takahashi, Satoru & Xiong, Siyang
- 505-523 Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation
by Rojo Arjona, David & Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei
- 524-541 Probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices
by Albizuri, M.J. & Goikoetxea, A.
- 542-558 The broken chain: Evidence against emotionally driven upstream indirect reciprocity
by Schnedler, Wendelin
- 559-585 Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
by Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Ziegler, Gabriel
2022, Volume 135, Issue C
- 1-15 Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
by Hillas, John & Samet, Dov
- 16-40 Issue linkage
by Currarini, S. & Marchiori, C.
- 41-59 Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation
by Awaya, Yu & Do, Jihwan
- 60-73 Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition
by Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Morton, Rebecca
- 74-78 On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games
by Steg, Jan-Henrik
- 79-85 Information design in sequential procurement
by Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin
- 86-95 Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy
by Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane
- 96-109 The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies
by Pérez-Castrillo, David & Sun, Chaoran
- 110-131 Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games
by Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone & Maccheroni, Fabio & Schmeidler, David
- 132-143 Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency
by Merzoni, Guido & Trombetta, Federico
- 144-167 Present bias in the labor market – when it pays to be naive
by Fahn, Matthias & Seibel, Regina
- 168-187 The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
by Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian
- 188-200 The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Guiñazú, Nadia & Juarez, Noelia & Neme, Pablo & Oviedo, Jorge
- 201-219 Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games
by Barthel, Anne-Christine & Hoffmann, Eric & Sabarwal, Tarun
- 220-240 Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form
by Heymann, Benjamin & De Lara, Michel & Chancelier, Jean-Philippe
- 241-270 The asymmetric effect of narratives on prosocial behavior
by Hillenbrand, Adrian & Verrina, Eugenio
- 271-296 Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform
by Aoyagi, Masaki & Yoo, Seung Han
- 297-326 Monitoring innovation
by Rodivilov, Alexander
- 327-337 Equilibrium non-existence in generalized games
by Tóbiás, Áron
- 338-355 Preferences and perceptions in Provision and Maintenance public goods
by Gächter, Simon & Kölle, Felix & Quercia, Simone
- 356-367 Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results
by Ramezanian, Rasoul & Feizi, Mehdi
- 368-393 Projection bias in effort choices
by Kaufmann, Marc
- 394-410 Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation
by Ke, Changxia & Morath, Florian & Newell, Anthony & Page, Lionel
- 411-433 The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
by Bó, Inácio & Hakimov, Rustamdjan
2022, Volume 134, Issue C
- 1-19 Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
by Dilmé, Francesc
- 20-36 When are groups less moral than individuals?
by Campos-Mercade, Pol
- 37-51 Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation
by Cui, Zhiwei & Shi, Fei
- 52-74 Control, cost, and confidence: Perseverance and procrastination in the face of failure
by Deimen, Inga & Wirtz, Julia
- 75-103 Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks
by Gallo, Edoardo & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan & Teh, Tat-How
- 104-116 Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing
by Chawla, Shuchi & Teng, Yifeng & Tzamos, Christos
- 117-126 Dynamic semi-consistency
by Bade, Sophie
- 127-150 A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games
by Cao, Yiyin & Dang, Chuangyin
- 151-168 Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation
by Saur, Marc P. & Schlatterer, Markus G. & Schmitt, Stefanie Y.
- 169-198 Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes
by Takeuchi, Ai & Veszteg, Róbert F. & Kamijo, Yoshio & Funaki, Yukihiko
- 199-228 The secretary recommendation problem
by Hahn, Niklas & Hoefer, Martin & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 229-241 Two-sided strategic information transmission
by Chiba, Saori & Hori, Kazumi
- 242-263 Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case
by Sémirat, Stéphan & Forges, Françoise
- 264-280 Simple equilibria in general contests
by Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver
- 281-307 The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation
by Babaioff, Moshe & Gonczarowski, Yannai A. & Nisan, Noam
- 308-343 Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy
by Daskalakis, Constantinos & Syrgkanis, Vasilis
- 344-360 Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values
by Chawla, Shuchi & Devanur, Nikhil R. & Karlin, Anna R. & Sivan, Balasubramanian
- 361-375 Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets
by Dvijotham, Krishnamurthy & Rabani, Yuval & Schulman, Leonard J.
- 376-398 Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
by Babichenko, Yakov & Rubinstein, Aviad
- 399-427 On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design
by Papadimitriou, Christos & Pierrakos, George & Psomas, Alexandros & Rubinstein, Aviad
- 428-448 Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding
by Dütting, Paul & Kesselheim, Thomas
2022, Volume 133, Issue C
- 1-27 Expectations-based loss aversion in contests
by Fu, Qiang & Lyu, Youji & Wu, Zenan & Zhang, Yuanjie
- 28-49 Fair cake-cutting in practice
by Kyropoulou, Maria & Ortega, Josué & Segal-Halevi, Erel
- 50-57 The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition
by Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo
- 58-76 Varieties of risk preference elicitation
by Friedman, Daniel & Habib, Sameh & James, Duncan & Williams, Brett
- 77-84 Strategic transfers between cooperative games
by Berden, Caroline & Peters, Hans & Robles, Laura & Vermeulen, Dries
- 85-108 Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
by Pahlke, Marieke
- 109-114 Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value
by Besner, Manfred
- 115-125 Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
by Noda, Shunya
- 126-137 Communication and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games
by Bahel, Eric & Ball, Sheryl & Sarangi, Sudipta
- 138-149 Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
by Basile, Achille & Rao, Surekha & Bhaskara Rao, K.P.S.
- 150-161 Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
by McMurray, Joseph
- 162-169 The influence of self and social image concerns on lying
by Bašić, Zvonimir & Quercia, Simone
- 170-180 Optimal attention management: A tractable framework
by Lipnowski, Elliot & Mathevet, Laurent & Wei, Dong
- 181-201 Parallel markets in school choice
by Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Evdokimov, Piotr & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Turhan, Bertan
- 202-229 Prize-linked savings games: Theory and experiment
by Jindapon, Paan & Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut & Viriyavipart, Ajalavat
- 230-247 Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks
by Safi, Shahir
- 248-255 A characterization of proportionally representative committees
by Aziz, Haris & Lee, Barton E.
- 256-281 Auctions with flexible information acquisition
by Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo
- 282-299 Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: The role of loss aversion and changing reference points
by Kleinberg, Jon & Kleinberg, Robert & Oren, Sigal
- 300-330 Search equilibrium with unobservable investment
by Rao, Neel
- 331-351 Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D.
2022, Volume 132, Issue C
- 1-21 Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games
by Pangallo, Marco & Sanders, James B.T. & Galla, Tobias & Farmer, J. Doyne
- 22-40 Do people maximize quantiles?
by de Castro, Luciano & Galvao, Antonio F. & Noussair, Charles N. & Qiao, Liang
- 41-58 Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab
by Dianat, Ahrash & Echenique, Federico & Yariv, Leeat
- 59-72 Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance
by Bicchieri, Cristina & Dimant, Eugen & Gächter, Simon & Nosenzo, Daniele
- 73-89 Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
by Harless, Patrick & Phan, William
- 90-105 Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining
by Hyndman, Kyle & Walker, Matthew J.
- 106-132 Market screening with limited records
by Kaya, Ayça & Roy, Santanu
- 133-165 A dynamic theory of spatial externalities
by Boucekkine, Raouf & Fabbri, Giorgio & Federico, Salvatore & Gozzi, Fausto
- 166-188 Limited Foresight Equilibrium
by Rampal, Jeevant
- 189-203 Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions
by Rosa, Benjamin V.
- 204-220 On incentive-compatible estimators
by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
- 221-233 Social learning in nonatomic routing games
by Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan
- 234-239 Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices
by Kirkegaard, René
- 240-254 Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring
by Azrieli, Yaron
- 255-273 Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
by Juárez, Noelia & Neme, Pablo & Oviedo, Jorge
- 274-287 Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles
by Konishi, Hideo & Pan, Chen-Yu & Simeonov, Dimitar
- 288-304 Cheap talk with private signal structures
by Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex
- 305-315 On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games
by Wu, Bin
- 316-327 Local public goods with weighted link formation
by Kinateder, Markus & Merlino, Luca Paolo
- 328-336 The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs
by D'Agostino, Elena & Seidmann, Daniel J.
- 337-352 Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests
by Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, Yuanzhu & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue
- 353-367 Stable cores in information graph games
by Núñez, Marina & Vidal-Puga, Juan
- 368-379 Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
by Iwase, Yusuke & Tsuruta, Shoya & Yoshimura, Akina
- 380-389 Voting on tricky questions
by Tajika, Tomoya
- 390-399 The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle
by Samet, Dov
- 400-420 College admissions with tuition transfers
by Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz
- 421-447 Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets
by Shuai, Jie & Yang, Huanxing & Zhang, Lan
- 448-462 Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games
by Allison, Blake A. & Bagh, Adib & Lepore, Jason J.
- 463-477 Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation
by Gomes, Armando
- 478-486 The general graph matching game: Approximate core
by Vazirani, Vijay V.
- 487-509 Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
by Grant, Simon & Stauber, Ronald
- 510-533 Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity
by Guha, Brishti & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
- 534-552 Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
by Bhattacharjee, Swagata
- 553-575 Robust coalitional implementation
by Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C.
- 576-591 Inductive inference with incompleteness
by Alon, Shiri & Bavly, Gilad & Gayer, Gabrielle
- 592-597 Informational robustness of common belief in rationality
by Ziegler, Gabriel
2022, Volume 131, Issue C
- 1-28 Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo
- 29-50 Idiosyncratic preferences in games on networks
by Orlova, Olena
- 51-56 The Trembling Chairman Paradox
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
- 57-83 Price discovery using a double auction
by Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E.
- 84-120 Dynamic mechanism design on social networks
by Meng, Dawen & Sun, Lei & Tian, Guoqiang
- 121-140 Social norms and preferences for generosity are domain dependent
by Erkut, Hande
- 141-170 Best response dynamics on random graphs
by Chellig, Jordan & Durbac, Calina & Fountoulakis, Nikolaos
- 171-185 The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information
by Georgiadis, George & Kim, Youngsoo & Kwon, H. Dharma
- 186-196 The welfare costs of informationally efficient prices
by Koren, Moran & Mueller-Frank, Manuel
- 197-221 Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles
by Bilò, Vittorio & Caragiannis, Ioannis & Flammini, Michele & Igarashi, Ayumi & Monaco, Gianpiero & Peters, Dominik & Vinci, Cosimo & Zwicker, William S.
- 222-244 How to add apples and oranges: Aggregating performances of different nature
by Cho, Wonki Jo
- 245-263 Information manipulation and competition
by Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias
- 264-274 A note on topological aspects in dynamic games of resource extraction and economic growth theory
by Jaśkiewicz, Anna & Nowak, Andrzej S.
- 275-291 Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing
by Bergemann, Dirk & Castro, Francisco & Weintraub, Gabriel
2021, Volume 130, Issue C
- 1-24 Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives
by Jehiel, Philippe & Singh, Juni
- 25-43 Designing practical and fair sequential team contests: The case of penalty shootouts
by Anbarcı, Nejat & Sun, Ching-Jen & Ünver, M. Utku
- 44-61 Noisy persuasion
by Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas
- 62-84 Nonlinear pricing with finite information
by Bergemann, Dirk & Yeh, Edmund & Zhang, Jinkun
- 85-108 Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
by Moldovanu, Benny & Rosar, Frank
- 109-130 Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection
by Dariel, Aurelie & Riedl, Arno & Siegenthaler, Simon
- 131-147 Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups
by Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela & Lergetporer, Philipp & Sutter, Matthias
- 148-178 Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo
by Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Syropoulos, Constantinos
- 179-195 Pledge-and-review in the laboratory
by Lippert, Steffen & Tremewan, James
- 196-210 Division of labor and the organization of knowledge in production: A laboratory experiment
by Klockmann, Victor & von Schenk, Alicia & von Siemens, Ferdinand A.
- 211-223 Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
by Bando, Keisuke & Kawasaki, Ryo
- 224-239 Co-worker altruism and unemployment
by Vásquez, Jorge & Weretka, Marek
- 240-257 Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams
by Schram, Peter
- 258-275 Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism
by Kartal, Melis & Müller, Wieland & Tremewan, James
- 276-298 Observation delays in teams and effort cycles
by Gordon, Sidartha & Marlats, Chantal & Ménager, Lucie
- 299-308 Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions
by Kumar, Ujjwal & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava & Yadav, Sonal & Zeng, Huaxia
- 309-330 Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment
by Puppe, Clemens & Rollmann, Jana
- 331-351 Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
by Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand
- 352-368 The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games
by Dal Bó, Pedro & Fréchette, Guillaume R. & Kim, Jeongbin
- 369-383 (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
by Blumrosen, Liad & Dobzinski, Shahar
- 384-399 The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: Implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action
by Kamali Shahdadi, Behrang
- 400-408 Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration
by Felgenhauer, Mike
- 409-424 Full farsighted rationality
by Karos, Dominik & Robles, Laura
- 425-442 Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy
by Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le
- 443-451 A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem
by Edelman, Paul H. & Por, Attila
- 452-464 De-biasing strategic communication
by Gesche, Tobias
- 465-473 Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels
by Sano, Ryuji
- 474-498 Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
by Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke & Tomoeda, Kentaro
- 499-520 Consumers' privacy choices in the era of big data
by Dengler, Sebastian & Prüfer, Jens
- 521-542 Monotone persuasion
by Mensch, Jeffrey
- 543-568 Value-free reductions
by Pérez-Castrillo, David & Sun, Chaoran
- 569-590 Games with second-order expected utility
by Beggs, Alan
- 591-601 Contract design with socially attentive preferences
by Koch, Simon & Weinschenk, Philipp
- 602-615 Are non-contingent incentives more effective in motivating new behavior? Evidence from the field
by Córdova, Angélica & Imas, Alex & Schwartz, Daniel
- 616-635 Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction
by Kirchkamp, Oliver & Mill, Wladislaw
- 636-662 General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis
by Frongillo, Rafael M. & Kash, Ian A.
- 663-683 Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
by Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne
- 684-689 Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219–238]
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi
2021, Volume 129, Issue C
- 1-14 Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
by Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, Zongwei & Riis, Christian
- 15-31 The multiplayer Colonel Blotto game
by Boix-Adserà, Enric & Edelman, Benjamin L. & Jayanti, Siddhartha
- 32-54 Cognitively-constrained learning from neighbors
by Li, Wei & Tan, Xu
- 55-77 An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches
by Saraiva, Gustavo
- 78-95 Early refund bonuses increase successful crowdfunding
by Cason, Timothy N. & Tabarrok, Alex & Zubrickas, Robertas
- 96-113 Regime change games with an active defender
by Jann, Ole & Schottmüller, Christoph
- 114-143 Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
by Cerrone, Claudia & Hermstrüwer, Yoan & Robalo, Pedro
- 144-157 Persuading a pessimist: Simplicity and robustness
by Nikzad, Afshin
- 158-180 Disclosure of information under competition: An experimental study
by Sheth, Jesal D.
- 181-197 Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
by Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang
- 198-237 How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field
by Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea
- 238-269 A model of gradual information disclosure
by Xu, Haibo
- 270-293 Model-based evaluation of cooling-off policies
by Michel, Christian & Stenzel, André
- 294-309 Preemption with a second-mover advantage
by Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew
- 310-328 Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist
by Correia-da-Silva, João
- 329-349 Gender stereotypes in deliberation and team decisions
by Coffman, Katherine & Flikkema, Clio Bryant & Shurchkov, Olga
- 350-369 Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
by Gori, Michele
- 370-399 Rollover risk and stress test credibility
by Pereira, Ana Elisa
- 400-420 Screening by mode of trade
by Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc
- 421-448 Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes
by Laica, Christoph & Lauber, Arne & Sahm, Marco
- 449-475 Optimal delay in committees
by Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing