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Equilibrium information in credence goods

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  • Liu, Ting
  • Ma, Ching-to Albert

Abstract

We study credence goods in a general model. A consumer may suffer a loss which is a continuous random variable. Privately observing the loss value, an expert can provide a repair at a price to eliminate the consumer's loss. All perfect-Bayesian equilibria are inefficient, in that some losses are not repaired. In closed form, we derive a pooling equilibrium (where losses are inferred to be in an interval), and a separating equilibrium (where losses are precisely inferred). If the expert can acquire an information structure on losses, the first best is achieved by a binary signal. Results are robust when cost and loss are random and correlated, and when there are multiple experts.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Ting & Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2024. "Equilibrium information in credence goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 84-101.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:145:y:2024:i:c:p:84-101
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.002
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credence goods; Experts; Separating equilibrium; Pooling equilibrium; Information acquisition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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