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Series handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe
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Content
2021, Volume 126, Issue C
- 251-277 The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity
by Gaudeul, Alexia & Keser, Claudia & Müller, Stephan
- 278-287 Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – evidence from a natural field experiment
by Kassis, Mark & Schmidt, Sascha L. & Schreyer, Dominik & Sutter, Matthias
- 288-304 Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? Reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection
by Briscese, Guglielmo & Feltovich, Nick & Slonim, Robert L.
- 305-334 Regularity of dynamic opinion games
by Venel, Xavier
- 335-354 Bargaining with a residual claimant: An experimental study
by Embrey, Matthew & Hyndman, Kyle & Riedl, Arno
- 355-373 Positive feedback in coordination games: Stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
by Hwang, Sung-Ha & Rey-Bellet, Luc
- 374-386 Moral hazard with limited liability: Random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
by Wang, Wenbin & Hu, Shanshan
- 387-401 Economic polarization and antisocial behavior: An experiment
by Bigoni, Maria & Bortolotti, Stefania & Nas Özen, Efşan
- 402-427 Consumer search with blind buying
by Chen, Yanbin & Li, Sanxi & Lin, Kai & Yu, Jun
- 428-442 The value of network information: Assortative mixing makes the difference
by Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric
- 443-452 Odds supermodularity and the Luce rule
by Doğan, Serhat & Yıldız, Kemal
- 453-459 On sequences of iterations of increasing and continuous mappings on complete lattices
by Olszewski, Wojciech
2021, Volume 125, Issue C
- 1-26 Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study
by Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R.
- 27-47 Dynamic expert incentives in teams
by Wong, Tsz-Ning & Yang, Lily Ling
- 48-61 Young children use commodities as an indirect medium of exchange
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D.
- 62-78 The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
by Leshno, Jacob D. & Pradelski, Bary S.R.
- 79-93 Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël
- 94-106 Attainment of equilibrium via Marshallian path adjustment: Queueing and buyer determinism
by Collins, Sean M. & James, Duncan & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan
- 107-140 The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an n-player extensive form game
by Etessami, Kousha
- 141-158 Elections under biased candidate endorsements — an experimental study
by Sun, Junze & Schram, Arthur & Sloof, Randolph
2020, Volume 124, Issue C
- 1-16 Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates
by Karakas, Leyla D. & Mitra, Devashish
- 17-42 A gift with thoughtfulness: A field experiment on work incentives
by Cao, Cangjian & Li, Sherry Xin & Liu, Tracy Xiao
- 43-61 Undiscounted bandit games
by Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven
- 62-81 Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
by Schlegel, Jan Christoph & Mamageishvili, Akaki
- 82-104 Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison
by García-Pola, Bernardo
- 105-121 Cheap talk with coarse understanding
by Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric
- 122-139 Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs
by Renault, Jérôme & Ziliotto, Bruno
- 140-168 On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets
by Levy, Yehuda John & Veiga, Andre
- 169-182 Equivalence of canonical matching models
by Kennes, John & le Maire, Daniel & Roelsgaard, Sebastian T.
- 183-206 Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty
by Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam C.L.
- 207-218 Backward induction in games without perfect recall
by Hillas, John & Kvasov, Dmitriy
- 219-238 On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi
- 239-253 Pathways of persuasion
by Coffman, Lucas & Niehaus, Paul
- 254-280 The timing of discretionary bonuses – effort, signals, and reciprocity
by Boosey, Luke & Goerg, Sebastian
- 281-287 Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets
by Shafer, Rachel C.
- 288-304 Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments
by d'Adda, Giovanna & Dufwenberg, Martin & Passarelli, Francesco & Tabellini, Guido
- 305-318 The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
by Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui
- 319-353 Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
by Ferrali, Romain
- 354-368 Can intermediaries assure contracts? Experimental evidence
by Mitzkewitz, Michael & Neugebauer, Tibor
- 369-385 When consumers do not make an active decision: Dynamic default rules and their equilibrium effects
by Ericson, Keith M. Marzilli
- 386-405 Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
by Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Mu'alem, Ahuva
- 406-431 Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
by Donna, Javier D. & Schenone, Pablo & Veramendi, Gregory F.
- 432-453 Regular potential games
by Swenson, Brian & Murray, Ryan & Kar, Soummya
- 454-477 Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information
by Abraham, Ittai & Athey, Susan & Babaioff, Moshe & Grubb, Michael D.
- 478-490 The capacity constrained facility location problem
by Aziz, Haris & Chan, Hau & Lee, Barton E. & Parkes, David C.
- 491-511 Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
by Sperisen, Benjamin & Wiseman, Thomas
- 512-533 A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
by Mackenzie, Andrew
- 534-553 Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
by Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel
- 554-568 The rationale of in-group favoritism: An experimental test of three explanations
by Ciccarone, Giuseppe & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Papa, Stefano
- 569-578 Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?
by Boonmanunt, Suparee & Kajackaite, Agne & Meier, Stephan
- 579-587 Entering classes in the college admissions model
by Wu, Qingyun
- 588-603 Never underestimate your opponent: Hindsight bias causes overplacement and overentry into competition
by Danz, David
- 604-619 Framing and repeated competition
by Masiliūnas, Aidas & Nax, Heinrich H.
- 620-643 Endogenous quantal response equilibrium
by Friedman, Evan
- 644-658 Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
by Sundararajan, Mukund & Yan, Qiqi
- 659-670 An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium
by Chen, Yin & Dang, Chuangyin
2020, Volume 123, Issue C
- 1-21 Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions
by Wu, Binzhen & Zhong, Xiaohan
- 22-40 Theories and cases in decisions under uncertainty
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Minardi, Stefania & Samuelson, Larry
- 41-53 Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
by Schlegel, Jan Christoph
- 54-67 Bayesian games with intentions
by Bjorndahl, Adam & Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael
- 68-80 Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
by Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Newton, Jonathan
- 81-100 Social learning with coordination motives
by Song, Yangbo & Zhang, Jiahua
- 101-119 Corrupt police
by Abbink, Klaus & Ryvkin, Dmitry & Serra, Danila
- 120-126 Rationalizable choice functions
by Yang, Yi-You
- 127-170 Feedback spillovers across tasks, self-confidence and competitiveness
by Banerjee, Ritwik & Gupta, Nabanita Datta & Villeval, Marie Claire
- 171-181 Group identification: An integrated approach
by Cho, Wonki Jo & Ju, Biung-Ghi
- 182-206 Fictitious play in networks
by Ewerhart, Christian & Valkanova, Kremena
- 210-227 Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods
by DeAngelo, Gregory & Gee, Laura K.
- 228-239 Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game
by Tajika, Tomoya
- 240-271 Reputation and news suppression in the media industry
by Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A.
- 272-287 Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion
by Li, Chen & Turmunkh, Uyanga & Wakker, Peter P.
- 288-294 Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential
by Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori
- 295-326 Tatonnement beyond gross substitutes? Gradient descent to the rescue
by Cheung, Yun Kuen & Cole, Richard & Devanur, Nikhil R.
- 327-341 Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient
by Feldman, Michal & Fu, Hu & Gravin, Nick & Lucier, Brendan
- 342-358 Clinching auctions with online supply
by Goel, Gagan & Mirrokni, Vahab & Paes Leme, Renato
- 359-376 The price of stability for undirected broadcast network design with fair cost allocation is constant
by Bilò, Vittorio & Flammini, Michele & Moscardelli, Luca
2020, Volume 122, Issue C
- 1-27 Distributions of centrality on networks
by Dasaratha, Krishna
- 28-54 Stability in matching markets with peer effects
by Bykhovskaya, Anna
- 55-82 Competition with an information clearinghouse and asymmetric firms: Why more than two firms compete (or not) for shoppers
by Arnold, Michael & Zhang, Lan
- 83-104 Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side
by Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Rainer, Catherine & Solan, Eilon
- 105-129 Fishing for fools
by Malmendier, Ulrike & Szeidl, Adam
- 130-149 Preordered service in contract enforcement
by Auerbach, Jan U. & Fonseca, Miguel A.
- 150-167 Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment
by Aina, Chiara & Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Gamba, Astrid
- 168-202 Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice
by Arigapudi, Srinivas
- 203-232 Dynamic price discovery: Transparency vs. information design
by Kakhbod, Ali & Song, Fei
- 233-239 The evolution of monetary equilibrium
by Norman, Thomas W.L.
- 240-255 A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
by Gatti, Nicola & Gilli, Mario & Marchesi, Alberto
- 256-276 Correlated beliefs: Predicting outcomes in 2 × 2 games
by Cason, Timothy N. & Sharma, Tridib & Vadovič, Radovan
- 277-289 Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can harm everyone
by Talamàs, Eduard & Vohra, Rakesh
- 290-317 Consulting collusive experts
by Mookherjee, Dilip & Motta, Alberto & Tsumagari, Masatoshi
- 318-327 Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian
by Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Julien, Ludovic
- 328-340 In-group bias in prisons
by Guo, Shiqi & Liang, Pinghan & Xiao, Erte
- 341-353 On self-serving strategic beliefs
by Ging-Jehli, Nadja R. & Schneider, Florian H. & Weber, Roberto A.
- 354-369 Information frictions and market power: A laboratory study
by Bayona, Anna & Brandts, Jordi & Vives, Xavier
- 370-390 Strategic decompositions of normal form games: Zero-sum games and potential games
by Hwang, Sung-Ha & Rey-Bellet, Luc
- 391-406 Habits as adaptations: An experimental study
by Matysková, Ludmila & Rogers, Brian & Steiner, Jakub & Sun, Keh-Kuan
- 407-412 A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem
by Dizdar, Deniz & Kováč, Eugen
- 413-425 Determinants of trust: The role of personal experiences
by Schwerter, Frederik & Zimmermann, Florian
- 426-439 Lexicographic probabilities and robustness
by Petri, Henrik
- 440-452 Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: A set-valued games approach
by Lehrer, Ehud & Teper, Roee
- 453-475 Information acquisition and welfare in network games
by Leister, C. Matthew
2020, Volume 121, Issue C
- 1-31 Endogenous group formation and responsibility diffusion: An experimental study
by Brütt, Katharina & Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep
- 32-54 Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
by Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne
- 55-75 Equal sacrifice taxation
by Stovall, John E.
- 76-89 Pre-matching gambles
by Zhang, Hanzhe
- 90-107 Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating
by Michaeli, Moti
- 108-116 Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
by Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele
- 117-145 On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining
by Navarro, Noemí & Veszteg, Róbert F.
- 146-168 A theory of decisive leadership
by Bernheim, B. Douglas & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
- 169-189 Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
by Fukuda, Satoshi
- 190-203 Communication via intermediaries
by Kwiek, Maksymilian
- 204-231 Matching through institutions
by Bloch, Francis & Cantala, David & Gibaja, Damián
- 232-251 Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice
by Fiedler, Susann & Hillenbrand, Adrian
- 252-264 Unraveling over time
by Ambuehl, Sandro & Groves, Vivienne
- 265-296 Starting small to communicate
by Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif
- 297-306 Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions
by Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle
- 307-328 Vagueness in multidimensional proposals
by Zhang, Qiaoxi
- 329-367 Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment
by Li, Ying Xue & Schipper, Burkhard C.
- 368-381 Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation
by Cabrales, Antonio & Feri, Francesco & Gottardi, Piero & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
- 382-412 Money burning in the theory of delegation
by Amador, Manuel & Bagwell, Kyle
- 413-434 Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets
by Knudson, Mathew
- 435-452 The agency costs of on-the-job search
by Herbold, Daniel & Schumacher, Heiner
- 453-481 Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse
by Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N.
- 482-505 Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
by Devanur, Nikhil R. & Haghpanah, Nima & Psomas, Alexandros
- 506-530 Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions
by Wittwer, Milena
- 533-547 Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures
by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Leonetti, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio
- 548-564 Affective empathy in non-cooperative games
by Vásquez, Jorge & Weretka, Marek
- 565-584 Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
by Liu, Peng
2020, Volume 120, Issue C
- 1-15 A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism
by Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M.
- 16-27 Identifiable information structures
by Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 28-57 Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games
by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Corrao, Roberto & Sanna, Federico
- 58-66 On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017)
by Doni, Nicola & Menicucci, Domenico
- 67-85 Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment
by Negrelli, Sara
- 86-95 A sandwich theorem for generic n × n two person games
by Sun, Ching-jen
- 96-120 Payoff information and learning in signaling games
by Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin
- 121-131 Innovation adoption and collective experimentation
by Sadler, Evan
- 132-143 The evolution of choice and learning in the two-person beauty contest game from kindergarten to adulthood
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D.
- 144-153 Assortative multisided assignment games: The extreme core points
by Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. Javier & Rafels, Carlos & Ybern, Neus
- 154-179 Weak belief and permissibility
by Catonini, Emiliano & De Vito, Nicodemo
- 180-192 A market design approach to job rotation
by Yu, Jingsheng & Zhang, Jun
- 193-208 Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments
by Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa
- 209-224 On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
by Catonini, Emiliano
- 225-245 Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games
by Mohlin, Erik & Östling, Robert & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
- 246-256 What you don't know can help you in school assignment
by Dur, Umut Mert & Morrill, Thayer
- 257-288 An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness
by Guarino, Pierfrancesco
- 289-310 Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal
by Hill, Brian
- 311-324 Bribing the Self
by Gneezy, Uri & Saccardo, Silvia & Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Veldhuizen, Roel
- 325-335 Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
by Chaturvedi, Rakesh
- 336-344 On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
by Alston, Max
- 345-369 Limited cognitive ability and selective information processing
by Leung, Benson Tsz Kin
- 370-390 Essentially stable matchings
by Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew
- 391-433 Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
by García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore & Kovářík, Jaromír
- 434-457 Self-rejecting mechanisms
by Correia-da-Silva, João
2020, Volume 119, Issue C
- 1-14 Myopic perception in repeated games
by Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan
- 15-29 The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
by Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram
- 30-55 Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model
by Ensthaler, Ludwig & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes
- 56-78 Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
by Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi
- 79-97 Agency, potential and contagion
by Newton, Jonathan & Sercombe, Damian
- 98-104 Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections
by Bernhardt, Dan & Ghosh, Meenakshi
- 110-122 On the roots of the intrinsic value of decision rights: Experimental evidence
by Ferreira, João V. & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Tarroux, Benoît
- 123-147 The attraction effect and its explanations
by Castillo, Geoffrey
- 148-171 Rehabilitation and social behavior: Experiments in prison
by Balafoutas, Loukas & García-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Jaber-Lopez, Tarek & Mitrokostas, Evangelos
- 172-188 Entry-deterring agency
by Loertscher, Simon & Niedermayer, Andras
- 189-196 Dominance rationality: A unified approach
by Hillas, John & Samet, Dov
- 197-215 Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
by Ziegler, Gabriel & Zuazo-Garin, Peio
- 216-233 Compromise and coordination: An experimental study
by He, Simin & Wu, Jiabin
- 234-250 Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game
by Margaria, Chiara
- 251-266 When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
by Zhang, Jun
- 267-287 The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions
by Noussair, Charles N. & Seres, Gyula
- 288-308 Perfect and proper equilibria in large games
by Sun, Xiang & Zeng, Yishu
- 309-338 Rational altruism? On preference estimation and dictator game experiments
by Grech, Philip D. & Nax, Heinrich H.
- 339-357 Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field experiment
by Bisin, Alberto & Hyndman, Kyle
- 358-382 Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations
by Li, Jin & Powell, Michael
- 383-391 Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins
by Solan, Eilon & Solan, Omri N. & Solan, Ron
2019, Volume 118, Issue C
- 1-6 On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria
by Balkenborg, Dieter & Vermeulen, Dries
- 7-28 Tick size, price grids and market performance: Stable matches as a model of market dynamics and equilibrium
by Plott, Charles & Roll, Richard & Seo, Han & Zhao, Hao
- 29-46 Group targeting under networked synergies
by Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric
- 47-59 Endogenous price leadership with an essential input
by Madden, Paul & Pezzino, Mario
- 60-71 Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: An axiomatic approach
by Alon, Shiri & Lehrer, Ehud
- 72-93 Global games with strategic complements and substitutes
by Hoffmann, Eric J. & Sabarwal, Tarun
- 94-109 On comparison of experts
by Kavaler, Itay & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 110-125 Rationalizable strategies in random games
by Pei, Ting & Takahashi, Satoru
- 126-140 Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: A tale of two rules
by Athanasoglou, Stergios
- 141-160 Farsighted stability in patent licensing: An abstract game approach
by Hirai, Toshiyuki & Watanabe, Naoki & Muto, Shigeo
- 161-175 Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
by Kim, Duk Gyoo
- 176-192 The endgame
by Banerjee, Anurag N. & Markovich, Sarit & Seccia, Giulio
- 193-218 Lying and reciprocity
by Dato, Simon & Feess, Eberhard & Nieken, Petra
- 219-240 Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation
by Tabasso, Nicole
- 241-268 The swing voter's curse in social networks
by Buechel, Berno & Mechtenberg, Lydia
- 269-283 Let me, or let George? Motives of competing altruists
by Bergstrom, Ted & Garratt, Rodney & Leo, Greg
- 284-294 Should straw polls be banned?
by Ali, S. Nageeb & Bohren, J. Aislinn
- 295-315 Information choice in a social learning experiment
by Duffy, John & Hopkins, Ed & Kornienko, Tatiana & Ma, Mingye
- 316-341 Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: The impact of higher-order history
by Gong, Binglin & Yang, Chun-Lei
- 342-353 Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
by De, Parikshit & Mitra, Manipushpak
- 354-365 Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture
by Newton, Jonathan & Wait, Andrew & Angus, Simon D.
- 366-373 Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago
by Doğan, Battal & Yenmez, M. Bumin
- 374-381 Obvious belief elicitation
by Tsakas, Elias
- 382-411 Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link”
by Barbieri, Stefano & Kovenock, Dan & Malueg, David A. & Topolyan, Iryna
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