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Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers

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  • Morimoto, Shuhei

Abstract

We study a class of matching problems in which monetary transfers are possible. In this paper, we establish a close connection between the core and the existence of desirable rules that satisfy strategy-proofness or one-sided strategy-proofness. In our main result, we show that the optimal core is a unified lower bound of welfare for the existence of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness (or one-sided strategy-proofness), efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy. Applying this result, we also obtain impossibility and characterization results in our environment.

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  • Morimoto, Shuhei, 2025. "Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 30-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:153:y:2025:i:c:p:30-41
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.001
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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