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Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness

Author

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  • Bogomolnaia, Anna
  • Baklanov, Artem
  • Victorova, Elizaveta

Abstract

A set of kn indivisible items is to be allocated to n agents; each agent has to get exactly k items, and agents have additive utilities over bundles. Can one find an efficient and approximately fair allocation? In this setting, we introduce new notions of approximate fairness, based on exchange of two single objects, and compare them to the “traditional” ones based on disregarding one object.

Suggested Citation

  • Bogomolnaia, Anna & Baklanov, Artem & Victorova, Elizaveta, 2025. "Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 226-245.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:154:y:2025:i:c:p:226-245
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hervé Moulin, 2019. "Fair Division in the Internet Age," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 407-441, August.
    2. Mithun Chakraborty & Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin & Warut Suksompong, 2021. "Picking Sequences and Monotonicity in Weighted Fair Division," Papers 2104.14347, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
    3. Haris Aziz & Rupert Freeman & Nisarg Shah & Rohit Vaish, 2024. "Best of Both Worlds: Ex Ante and Ex Post Fairness in Resource Allocation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 72(4), pages 1674-1688, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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