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Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare

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  • Sheung Man Yuen
  • Warut Suksompong

Abstract

In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule has recently been characterized as the only rule within the class of additive welfarist rules that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. We extend this characterization to the class of all welfarist rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Sheung Man Yuen & Warut Suksompong, 2023. "Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare," Papers 2301.03798, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2301.03798
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2301.03798
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Suksompong, Warut, 2023. "A characterization of maximum Nash welfare for indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    2. Hervé Moulin, 2019. "Fair Division in the Internet Age," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 407-441, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. D. Marc Kilgour & Rudolf Vetschera, 2024. "Two-Person Fair Division with Additive Valuations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 745-774, August.
    2. Luisa Montanari & Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin & Warut Suksompong & Nicholas Teh, 2025. "Weighted envy-freeness for submodular valuations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 65(4), pages 983-1016, December.
    3. Yuen, Sheung Man & Suksompong, Warut, 2023. "Extending the characterization of maximum Nash welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    4. Warut Suksompong & Nicholas Teh, 2023. "Weighted Fair Division with Matroid-Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness," Papers 2303.14454, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    5. Suksompong, Warut & Teh, Nicholas, 2023. "Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: Monotonicity and strategyproofness," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 48-59.
    6. Karen Frilya Celine & Warut Suksompong & Sheung Man Yuen, 2024. "On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules," Papers 2412.15472, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2026.
    7. Xiaohui Bei & Xinhang Lu & Warut Suksompong, 2025. "Truthful cake sharing," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 64(1), pages 309-343, February.
    8. Felix Brandt & Matthias Greger & Erel Segal-Halevi & Warut Suksompong, 2023. "Coordinating Charitable Donations with Leontief Preferences," Papers 2305.10286, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2025.

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