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Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare

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  • Sheung Man Yuen
  • Warut Suksompong

Abstract

In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule has recently been characterized as the only rule within the class of additive welfarist rules that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. We extend this characterization to the class of all welfarist rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Sheung Man Yuen & Warut Suksompong, 2023. "Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare," Papers 2301.03798, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2301.03798
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2301.03798
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Suksompong, Warut, 2023. "A characterization of maximum Nash welfare for indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    2. Hervé Moulin, 2019. "Fair Division in the Internet Age," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 407-441, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Warut Suksompong & Nicholas Teh, 2023. "Weighted Fair Division with Matroid-Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness," Papers 2303.14454, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    2. Yuen, Sheung Man & Suksompong, Warut, 2023. "Extending the characterization of maximum Nash welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    3. Felix Brandt & Matthias Greger & Erel Segal-Halevi & Warut Suksompong, 2023. "Balanced Donor Coordination," Papers 2305.10286, arXiv.org.

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