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A characterization of maximum Nash welfare for indivisible goods

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  • Suksompong, Warut

Abstract

In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) rule, which chooses an allocation maximizing the product of the agents’ utilities, has received substantial attention for its fairness. We characterize MNW as the only additive welfarist rule that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. Our characterization holds even in the simplest setting of two agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Suksompong, Warut, 2023. "A characterization of maximum Nash welfare for indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:222:y:2023:i:c:s016517652200430x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110956
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Erel Segal-Halevi & Balázs R. Sziklai, 2019. "Monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cutting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 363-401, September.
    2. Xiaohui Bei & Xinhang Lu & Warut Suksompong, 2021. "Truthful Cake Sharing," Papers 2112.05632, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sheung Man Yuen & Warut Suksompong, 2023. "Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare," Papers 2301.03798, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
    2. Felix Brandt & Matthias Greger & Erel Segal-Halevi & Warut Suksompong, 2023. "Balanced Donor Coordination," Papers 2305.10286, arXiv.org.
    3. Yuen, Sheung Man & Suksompong, Warut, 2023. "Extending the characterization of maximum Nash welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    4. Warut Suksompong & Nicholas Teh, 2023. "Weighted Fair Division with Matroid-Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness," Papers 2303.14454, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.

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