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Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment (working paper version)

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  • David K Levine
  • Andrea Mattozzi

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  • David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2017. "Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment (working paper version)," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001401, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001401
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000001401.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Terry M. Moe, 2006. "Political Control and the Power of the Agent," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 1-29, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2020. "Voting and Contributing When the Group Is Watching," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 246-276, August.
    2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Alberto Alesina & Bryony Reich & Alessandro Riboni, 2017. "Nation-Building, Nationalism and Wars," NBER Working Papers 23435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Bryony Reich & Alessandro Riboni, 2020. "Nation-building, nationalism, and $$\hbox {wars}^*$$ wars ∗," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 381-430, December.
    5. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam is not listed on IDEAS

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