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Bureaucrats in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany

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  • Brändle, Thomas

    () (University of Basel)

  • Stutzer, Alois

    () (University of Basel)

Abstract

This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we find that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.

Suggested Citation

  • Brändle, Thomas & Stutzer, Alois, 2008. "Bureaucrats in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany," Working papers 2008/07, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  • Handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2008/07
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political selection; parliamentary election; public servants; incompatibility;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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