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The Financing of a Public Utility

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  • Eric Smith
  • Martin Shubik

Abstract

The interaction of capital stock with overlapping generations is investigated where the time structures of human capital and other physical capital does not match. We consider the economies with either gold or fiat as the outside money and consider the financing problems that appear in the financing of capital stock. The complexity of the underlying physical structure combined with concern for efficiency and equity help to determine the financial structure.
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Suggested Citation

  • Eric Smith & Martin Shubik, 2012. "The Financing of a Public Utility," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000532, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000532
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000000532.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    2. Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(6), pages 467-467.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
    4. J. v. Neumann, 1945. "A Model of General Economic Equilibrium," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 13(1), pages 1-9.
    5. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • E41 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Demand for Money

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