Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence
In a duopoly market, aspirations express how much sellers want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We define individually and mutually satisficing sales behavior for given individual beliefs and aspirations. In a first experimental phase, whenever satisficing is not possible, beliefs, aspirations, or sales have to be adapted. In a second phase, testing the absorption of satisficing, participants are free to select nonsatisficing sales profiles. The results reveal that most people are satisficers who, either mandatorily or deliberately, tend to adjust aspiration levels if they cannot be satisfied.
|Date of creation:||16 May 2007|
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|Note:||Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.|
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