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Satisficing in strategic environments: A theoretical approach and experimental evidence

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  • Güth, Werner
  • Vittoria Levati, M.
  • Ploner, Matteo

Abstract

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. We formally define the concept of satisficing and propose a theory that allows satisficing players to make "optimal" decisions without being equipped with any prior. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Güth, Werner & Vittoria Levati, M. & Ploner, Matteo, 2010. "Satisficing in strategic environments: A theoretical approach and experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 554-561, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:39:y:2010:i:5:p:554-561
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Jianying Qiu, 2006. "Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    2. Guth, Werner, 2007. "Satisficing in portfolio selection--Theoretical aspects and experimental tests," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 505-522, August.
    3. Dixon, Huw David, 2000. "Keeping up with the Joneses: competition and the evolution of collusion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 223-238, October.
    4. Napel, Stefan, 2003. "Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 86-106, April.
    5. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2006. "Is Satisficing Absorbable? - An Experimental Study," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    6. Werner G³th & Hartmut Kliemt, 2004. "Bounded Rationality and Theory Absorption," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 521-541.
    7. Arthur, W Brian, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 406-411, May.
    8. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    9. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levatia & Matteo Ploner, 2008. "Satisficing and prior-free optimality in price competition: a theoretical and experimental analysis," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-067, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
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    Cited by:

    1. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2010. "(Un)Bounded Rationality in Decision Making and Game Theory – Back to Square One?," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(1), pages 1-13, March.
    2. Tobias Scheffel & Georg Ziegler & Martin Bichler, 2012. "On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(4), pages 667-692, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic interaction Satisficing behavior Bounded rationality;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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