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Optimal gelaufen, einfach zufrieden oder unüberlegt gehandelt? Zur Theorie (un)eingeschränkt rationalen Entscheidens

  • Werner Güth

How should we react to experiments that refute pure selfishness? Are deviations in action space only important if they imply considerable losses? For (un)bounded rationality it is unimportant which payoff declines lead to more or less adequate decision considerations. But also for unreflected actions a bad outcome need not necessarily arise if for example institutional frameworks exclude or restrict the exploitation of naïve agents. The comparison of rational and unreflected decisions is not reduced to action and payoff spaces, but extended to cognition space. The conceptual comparison is illustrated by results from laboratory experiments. Copyright 2009 der Autor Journal compilation 2009, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Article provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.

Volume (Year): 10 (2009)
Issue (Month): s1 (05)
Pages: 75-100

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Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:10:y:2009:i:s1:p:75-100
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  1. Gerlinde Fellner & Werner Güth & Boris Maciejovsky, 2005. "Satisficing in Financial Decision Making A Theoretical and Experimental Attempt to Explore Bounded Rationality," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  2. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  3. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Gueth, Werner & Levati, M. Vittoria & Qiu, Jianying, 2007. "Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-03, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  4. Smith,Vernon L., 2008. "Rationality in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521871358, November.
  5. Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter & Werner Güth, 2005. "Bargaining Outside the Lab - A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-04, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  6. Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter & Werner Guth, 2003. "Fairness in the mail and opportunism in the internet - a newspaper experiment on ultimatum bargaining," Artefactual Field Experiments 00051, The Field Experiments Website.
  7. Werner Gueth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2007. "Scenario-Based Satisficing in Saving: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-049, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  8. Bester, H. & Güth, W., 1994. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?," Discussion Paper 1994-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Gary E Bolton & Rami Zuwick, 2010. "Anonymity versus punishments in ultimatum bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 826, David K. Levine.
  10. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2008. "What Ethics Can Learn From Experimental Economics - If Anything," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-062, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  11. Bolton, Gary E, 1991. "A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-136, December.
  12. Camerer, Colin & Weber, Martin, 1992. "Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 325-70, October.
  13. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2001. "The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 161-169, October.
  14. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1996. "The evolution of walrasian behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD 1996-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  15. Vital Anderhub & Werner Gäuth & Wieland Mäuller & Martin Strobel, 2000. "An Experimental Analysis of Intertemporal Allocation Behavior," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-152, October.
  16. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  17. Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1997. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment," Game Theory and Information 9707009, EconWPA, revised 22 Jul 1997.
  18. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
  19. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
  20. Werner Güth & Stefan Napel, 2006. "Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 1037-1056, October.
  21. Steffen Huck & Joerg Oechssler, 1995. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Game Theory and Information 9507001, EconWPA, revised 27 Aug 1998.
  22. Thomas Gehrig & Werner Güth & Rene Levinsky & Vera Popova, 2008. "Do investors optimize, follow heuristics, or listen to experts?," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-086, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  23. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
  24. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2004. "Zur ökonomischen Modellierung der Grundlagen und Wurzeln menschlicher Kulturfähigkeit," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-18, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
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