# David K. Levine

# Levine's Working Paper Archive

**For corrections or technical questions regarding this series, please contact (David K. Levine)**

**Series handle:**repec:cla:levarc

**Citations RSS feed:**at CitEc

### Impact factors

- Simple (last 10 years)
- Recursive (10)
- Discounted (10)
- Recursive discounted (10)
- H-Index (10)
- Aggregate (10)

**Access and download statistics**

**Top item:**

- By citations
- By downloads (last 12 months)

### 2010

**381 Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations***by*T. Borgers & R. Sarin**380 Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics***by*T. Borgers & R. Sarin**379 Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty***by*E. Dekel & D. Fudenberg**378 Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge***by*T. Börgers**375 Strategic Irrationality in Extensive Games***by*Kaushik Basu**374 An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication***by*Y. G. Kim & J. Sobel**372 Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals***by*R. Boylan**369 Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability***by*A. Rubinstein & A. Wolinsky**310 Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism***by*R. M. Isaac & J. M. Walker**295 Ultimatum bargaining behavior: a survey and comparison of results***by*W. Guth & R. Tietz**291 An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining***by*W. Guth & R. Schmittberger & B. Schwartz**268 Do biases in probability judgement matter in markets: experimental evidence***by*Colin Camerer**263 A comparative model of bargaining: theory and evidence***by*G. Bolton**252 Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model***by*Ariel Rubinstein**250 Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium***by*Richard Rogerson**240 Convergence of Least Squares Learning in Environments With Private Information***by*Albert Marcet & Tom Sargent**24 Power Relations in Exchange Networks***by*Barry Markovsky & David Willer & Travis Patton**239 Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma***by*David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson**234 Learning Rational Expectations: The Finite State Case***by*James Jordan**233 Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle***by*Gary Hansen**232 Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture***by*Faruk Gul & Hugo Sonnenschein & Robert Wilson**230 A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information and Learning by Doing***by*Sandy Grossman**2200 Negotiated Exchange in Social Networks***by*Michael Lovaglia & John Skvoretz & David Willer & Barry Markovsky**2199 The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results***by*K. S. Cook & R. M. Emerson & M. R. Gillmore & T. Yamagishi**2189 The Seeds of Weak Power: an Extension of Network Exchange Theory***by*Barry Markovsky & John Skvoretz & David Willer & Michael Lovaglia & Jeffrey Erger**218 Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games***by*Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps**2179 On Efficient Distribution with Private Information***by*Andrew Atkeson & Robert E Lucas**215 An Example of Convergence to Rational Expectation With Heterogeneous Beliefs***by*M. Feldman**2087 Decentralizing Lottery Allocations in Markets With Indivisible Commodities***by*Rod Garratt**2077 Income Fluctuations and Asymmetric Information: An Example of the Repeated Principal Agent Problem***by*J. Thomas & T. Worrall**2070 A Law of Large Numbers for Large Economies***by*Harald Uhlig**2069 Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard***by*Edward C Prescott & Robert M Townsend**2064 Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets***by*Cheng Wang**2061 Indivisibilities, Lotteries and Sunspot Equilibria***by*Karl Shell & Randall Wright**2054 Randomization with Asymmetric Information***by*Richard Arnott & Joseph E Stiglitz**2053 Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing Without Commitment***by*Narayana Kocherlakota**205 Learning, Estimation, and the Stability of Rational Expectations***by*Margaret Bray**2031 Game theory models for exchange Networks: experimental results***by*E. J. Bienenstock & P. Bonacich**2010 Exclusion and Power: a Test of Four Theories of Power in Exchange Networks***by*John Skvoretz & David Willer**2006 On the Long Run Implications of Repeated Moral Hazard***by*Christopher Phelan**200 International lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation***by*Andrew Atkeson**199 Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring***by*Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti**197 Information Aggregation Through Costly Political Action***by*Susanne Lohmann**1953 Ex Ante Randomization in Agency Models***by*J C Fellingham & Y K Kwon & D P Newman**1909 Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage***by*Harold L Cole & Narayana Kocherlakota**1898 Asset Pricing When Risk Sharing is Limited by Default***by*Fernando Alvarez & Urban J Jermann**187 Point and Line vulnerability as Bases for Predicting the Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Reply to Willer***by*Karen S. Cook & Mary Gillmore & Toshio Yamagishi**184 The Dynamics of Power in Social Exchange***by*Linda Molm**1718 Learning in High stakes utlimatum and market games. An experiment in the Slovak Republic***by*Robert Slonim & Alvin E Roth**1409 A Model of Inventive Activity and Capital Accumulation***by*Karl Shell**1408 Inventive Activity, Industrial Organization and Economic Growth***by*Karl Shell**1407 Toward A Theory of Inventive Activity and Capital Accumulation***by*Karl Shell**1402 The equity risk premium: a solution***by*T. Reitz**1401 The equity premium: a puzzle***by*R. Mehra & E. Prescott**1400 First order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle***by*L. Epstein & S. Zin**1398 The equity premium and the allocation of income risk***by*J. Danthine & J. Donaldson & R. Mehra**1396 The equity premium and the risk-free rate: matching the moments***by*S.G. Cecchetti & P. Lam & N.C. Mark**1395 Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Jones***by*A. Abel**1394 The Turnpike of Dynamic General Equilibrium Paths and its Insensitivity to Initial Conditions***by*M. Yano**1393 Learning by Doing and the Introduction of New Goods***by*Nancy Stokey**1389 Turnpike Theory***by*L. W. McKenzie**1388 The Classical Theorem on Existence of Competitive Equilibrium***by*L. W. McKenzie**1386 Appropriation and Efficiency: A Revision of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics***by*Lewis Makowski & Joseph Ostroy**1385 A New Approach to Consumer Theory***by*K. K. Lancaster**1383 Endogenous Growth with Multisector Ramsey Models***by*J. Dolmas**1382 Growth and Indeterminacy in Dynamic Models with Externalities***by*Michele Boldrin & Aldo Rustichini**1381 An Integration of Equilibrium Theory and Turnpike Theory***by*Truman Bewley**1380 Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?***by*Thomas R. Palfrey & Jeffrey Prisbrey**125 Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem***by*F Gjesdal**122247000000002180 Bubbles and Crashes with Partially Sophisticated Investors***by*Milo Bianchi & Philippe Jehiel**122247000000002153 Strong Bubbles and Common Expected Bubbles in a Finite Horizon Model***by*Jie Zheng**122247000000002108 Strategy-proofness vs. Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redisigning the NYC High School Match***by*Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A Pathak & Alvin E Roth**1193 A theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and cultural change as informational Cascades***by*Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch**117 Computing Multi-Period, Information Constrained Optima***by*Christopher Phelan & Robert M Townsend**115 The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Productivity Paradox***by*Paul David**11 Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Very Large Groups***by*R. M Isaac & J. Walker & A. Williams**101 The Downsian Model of Electoral Participation: Formal Theory and Empirical Analysis of the Constituency Size Effect***by*Stephen Hansen & Thomas R Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal

### 2009

**843644000000000332 Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine**814577000000000415 Expectations as Endowments: Reference-Dependent Preferences and Exchange Behavior***by*Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Andreas Fuster**814577000000000398 Prizes and Patents: Using Market Signals to Provide Incentives for Innovations***by*V. V. Chari & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski**814577000000000384 Learning Self-Control***by*S. Nageeb Ali**814577000000000379 Equilibrium Trust***by*Luca Anderlini & Daniele Terlizzese**814577000000000374 Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets***by*Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant**814577000000000361 Grading Exams: 100, 99, 98,... or A, B, C?***by*Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos**814577000000000356 Hyperbolic discounting is rational: Valuing the far future with uncertain discount rates***by*J. Doyne Farmer & John Geanakoplos**814577000000000351 Uphill Self-Control***by*Jawwad Noor & Norio Takeoka**814577000000000344 On the Smooth Ambiguity Model: A Reply***by*Peter Klibano & Massimo Marinacci & Sujoy Mukerji**814577000000000339 How (Not) to Do Decision Theory***by*Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman**814577000000000335 Questions in Decision Theory***by*Itzhak Gilboa**814577000000000330 Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication***by*Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park**814577000000000324 Subjectivity in Inductive Inference***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson**814577000000000319 Self-Deception and Choice***by*Igor Kopylov & Jawwad Noor**814577000000000313 Indeterminacy Of Competitive Equilibrium With Risk Of Default***by*Gaetano Bloise & Pietro Reichlin & Mario Tirelli**814577000000000309 Altruism, Turnout and Strategic Voting Behavior***by*Ozgur Evren**814577000000000297 A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change***by*Franz Dietrich & Christian List**814577000000000292 Social Learning with Coarse Inference***by*Antonio Guarino & Philippe Jehie**814577000000000284 Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring***by*Josh Cherry & Lones Smith**814577000000000279 On Reputational Rents as an Incentive Mechanism in Competitive Markets***by*Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita**814577000000000274 Is Behavioral Economics Doomed?***by*David K Levine**814577000000000269 A Relationship between Risk and Time Preferences***by*Kota Saito**814577000000000264 Choice under Pressure: A Dual Preference Model and Its Application***by*Tolga Koker**814577000000000259 Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments***by*Karl H. Schlag & Andriy Zapechelnyuk**814577000000000254 THE RESOLUTION GAME A Multiple Selves Perspective***by*Dimitri Migrow & Matthias Uhl**814577000000000248 The Refined Best-Response Correspondence and Backward Induction***by*Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics**814577000000000242 Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement in Imperfect Markets***by*Jiahua Che & Larry Qiu & Wen Zhou**814577000000000236 Need I remind you? Monitoring with collective memory***by*David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen**814577000000000231 Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic two-player games***by*Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson**814577000000000219 Fairness Motivations and Procedures of Choice between Lotteries as Revealed through Eye Movements***by*Amos Arieli & Yaniv Ben-Ami & Ariel Rubinstein**814577000000000206 Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous and Nonconvex Games***by*Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian**814577000000000201 Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments***by*Ron Seigel**814577000000000197 Contagion of Liquidity Crisis between Firms***by*Dong Chuhl Oh**814577000000000193 How Exposure to Markets Can Favor Inequity Averse Preferences***by*Robertas Zubrickas**814577000000000186 Implementing the Nash Program in Stochastic Games***by*Dilip Abreu & David Pearce**814577000000000178 A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games***by*V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailathy & Stephen Morris**814577000000000174 Herding versus Hotelling: Market Entry with Costly Information***by*David B. Ridley**814577000000000169 Quality, Upgrades, and (the Loss of) Market Power in a Dynamic Monopoly Model***by*James J. Anton & Gary Biglaiser**814577000000000164 Is the “curse of natural resources” really a curse?***by*Pietro F. Peretto**814577000000000160 The Existence of Equilibria in Games with Arbitrary Strategy Spaces and Payoffs: A Full Characterization***by*Guoqiang Tian**814577000000000155 Robust Virtual Implementation***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**814577000000000151 Innovation and Equilibrium?***by*Martin Shubik**814577000000000145 The Value of Fiat Money with an Outside Bank: An Experimental Game***by*Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder**814577000000000139 Fragility of Asymptotic Agreement under Bayesian Learning***by*Daron Acemoglu & Victor Chernozhukov & Muhamet Yildiz**814577000000000134 Matching, Aspiration and Long-Term Relationship***by*In-Koo Cho & Akihiko Matsui**814577000000000130 How Exposure to Markets Can Favor Inequity-Averse Preferences***by*Robertas Zubrickas**814577000000000125 Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Two Players, Perfect Information, and Generic Payoffs***by*Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson**814577000000000121 Uncertain delivery in markets for lemons***by*Joao Correia-da-Silva**814577000000000116 An Analysis of the Dismal Theorem***by*William D. Nordhaus**814577000000000109 Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**814577000000000099 Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example***by*Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton**814577000000000092 A Model of Discovery***by*Michele Boldrin & David K Levine**814577000000000087 The Evolution of Time Preference with Aggregate Uncertainty***by*Arthur J. Robson & Larry Samuelson**814577000000000081 Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation***by*Daron Acemoglu & Kostas Bimpikis & Asuman E. Ozdaglar**814577000000000076 A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing***by*Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri**814577000000000071 Out of Equilibrium Profit and Innovation***by*Cristiano Antonelli & Giuseppe Scellato**814577000000000067 A Simple Theory of Scientific Learning***by*Glen Weyl**814577000000000059 Managing Strategic Buyers***by*Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson**814577000000000046 Venture Capital and Sequential Investments***by*Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege & Liang Peng**671757000000000016 The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments***by*David K Levine

### 2008

**814577000000000038 Strong Bubbles and Common Expected Bubbles in a Finite Horizon Model***by*Jie Zheng**814577000000000030 Waiting to Copy: On the Dynamics of the Market for Technology***by*Emeric Henry & Carlos J. Ponce**814577000000000024 General equilibrium with private state verification***by*Joao Correia-da-Silva & Carlos Herves-Beloso**671757000000000010 A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine**671757000000000001 Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information'***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Eric Maskin**618897000000001023 Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection***by*Michele Boldrin & David K Levine**122247000000002431 Towards a Characterization of Rational***by*Itai Arieli**122247000000002427 Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size***by*Abraham Neyman**122247000000002422 Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case***by*Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir**122247000000002416 Elections Can be Manipulated Often***by*Ehud Friedgut & Gil Kalai & Noam Nisan**122247000000002411 Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling***by*Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan**122247000000002406 Cooperative Games in Strategic Form***by*Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell**122247000000002399 Three Field Experiments on Procrastination and Willpower***by*Nicholas Burger & Gary Charness & John Lynham**122247000000002394 Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees***by*Matias Iaryczower**122247000000002387 Ideology and Competence in Alternative Electoral Systems***by*Matias Iaryczower & Andrea Mattozzi**122247000000002381 Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs***by*Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson**122247000000002376 Axiomatic Models of Bargaining***by*Alvin E Roth**122247000000002358 Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections***by*Alberto Alesina & Richard Holden**122247000000002352 Can News Be a Major Source of Aggregate Fluctuations? A Bayesian DSGE Approach***by*Ippei Fujiwara & Yasuo Hirose & Mototsugu Shintani**122247000000002346 Comparing Models of Strategic Thinking in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s Coordination Games***by*Miguel A Costa-Gomes & Vincent P Crawford & Nagore Iriberri**122247000000002340 The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism***by*Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki**122247000000002336 Rationalization and Cognitive Dissonance: Do Choices Affect or Reflect Preferences?***by*M. Keith Chen**122247000000002330 Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles? Some Microeconomic Issues***by*John R. Conlon**122247000000002324 Confronting the Robinson Crusoe paradigm with household-size heterogeneity***by*Christos Koulovatianos & Carsten Schröder & Ulrich Schmidt**122247000000002317 Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine**122247000000002312 The Relationship Between Classical and Quantum Correlation in Games***by*Adam Brandenburger**122247000000002307 Repeated Relationships with Limits on Information Processing***by*Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite**122247000000002301 Job Market Signalling and Job Search***by*Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan**122247000000002297 The sure-thing principle and independence of irrelevant knowledge***by*Dov Samet**122247000000002291 Affective Decision Making and the Ellsberg Paradox***by*Anat Bracha & Donald Brown**122247000000002286 Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**122247000000002281 New York City Cabdrivers’ Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income***by*Vincent P Crawford & Juanjuan Meng**122247000000002276 Prejudice and Immigration***by*Paolo E Giordani & Michele Ruta**122247000000002269 Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source Industries***by*Michele Boldrin & David K Levine**122247000000002262 Appropriation and Intellectual Property***by*Michele Boldrin & David K Levine**122247000000002258 Essays in Aggregate Information, The Media and Special Interests***by*Zacharias Maniadis**122247000000002254 Essays on Political Economy***by*Paulo Melo-Filho**122247000000002250 Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics***by*Guillermo Ordonez**122247000000002243 Essays in Applied Theory***by*Viola Chen**122247000000002236 Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships***by*Ichiro Obara & David Rahman**122247000000002230 Reforming Social Security with Progressive Personal Accounts***by*John Geanakoplos & Stephen P Zeldes**122247000000002225 Overlapping Generations Models of General Equilibrium***by*John Geanakoplos**122247000000002219 Pareto Improving Taxes***by*John Geanakoplos & H M Polemchakis**122247000000002215 Bayesian games: games of incomplete information***by*Shmuel Zamir**122247000000002211 Economics and Common Sense***by*Gil Kalai**122247000000002205 Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Form Games***by*Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell**122247000000002199 Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling***by*Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan**122247000000002192 Political Economy of Ramsey Taxation***by*Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski**122247000000002185 Measurable Ambiguity***by*Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer**122247000000002175 Optimal Insurance with Adverse Selection***by*Hector Chade & Edward Schlee**122247000000002167 Quality, Upgrades, and (the Loss of) Market Power in a Dynamic Monopoly Model***by*James J Anton & Gary Biglaiser**122247000000002161 Revealed Conflicting Preferences***by*Attila Ambrus & Kareen Rozen**122247000000002142 Overconfidence?***by*Jean Pierre Benoit & Juan Dubra**122247000000002137 Advertising, Entry Deterrence, and Industry Innovation***by*Shi Qi**122247000000002121 Elections Can be Manipulated Often***by*Ehud Friedgut & Gil Kalai & Noam Nisan**122247000000002115 Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case***by*Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir**122247000000002102 Moderating Political Extremism: Single vs. Dual Ballot Elections***by*Massimo Bordignon & Guido Tabellini**122247000000002091 Can a Preferential Trade Agreement Benefit Neighbor Countries without Compensating Them?***by*Masahiro Endoh & Koichi Hamada & Koji Shimomura**122247000000002086 Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining***by*Kareen Rozen**122247000000002080 A ‘Dual’-Improved Shortcut to the Long Run***by*Kareen Rozen**122247000000002074 Emerging Markets in an Anxious Global Economy***by*Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos**122247000000002067 The Virtues and Vices of Equilibrium and the Future of Financial Economics***by*J. Doyne Farmer & John Geanakoplos