The Case for Last-Second Bidding
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- Jeffrey C. Ely & Tanjim Hossain, 2009.
"Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 68-94, August.
- Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2003.
"Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
992, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006. "Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
- Said, Maher, 2008.
"Dynamic Markets with Randomly Arriving Agents,"
9868, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tanjim Hossain, 2008. "Learning by bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 509-529.
- Raul Gonzalez & Kevin Hasker & Robin C. Sickles, 2009. "AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN eBAY AUCTIONS," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 54(03), pages 441-472.
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