Multiple bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations," Working Papers 0902, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Cotton, Christopher, 2007. "Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations," MPRA Paper 1844, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002.
"Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, "undated". "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. " The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-355, Summer.
- Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006.
"Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
- Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 992, CESifo Group Munich.
- William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
- Rasmusen Eric Bennett, 2006.
"Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-22, November.
- Eric B. Rasmusen, 2001. "Starategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One's Own Private Value in Auctions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-127, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Eric Rasmusen, 2004. "Strategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One’s Own Private Value in Auctions," Working Papers 2004-13, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Tim Grebe & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2009.
"Buy-it-Now Prices in eBay Auctions-The Field in the Lab,"
Cahiers de recherche
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Grebe, Tim & Kröger, Sabine, 2014. "Buy-it-Now Prices in eBay Auctions The Field in the Lab," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100611, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2010. "Buy-It-Now prices in eBay Auctions - The Field in the Lab," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 294, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Christopher Cotton, 2009. "Sniping to Avoid the Endowment E ect in Auctions," Working Papers 2010-13, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Wenchuan Liu & Yu Zhang & Qi Li, 2015. "A semiparametric varying coefficient model of monotone auction bidding processes," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 313-335, February.
More about this item
KeywordsAuction eBay Multiple bidding Value discovery;
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:3:p:148-150. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .