Multiple bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations
A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about his private valuation over time (as he has more time to consider using the item), and (2) there is a positive probability he is unable to return to the auction to submit a bid in a later period. Evidence from a classroom experiment supports the theoretical findings.
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- Eric Rasmusen, 2004.
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2004-13, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
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"Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction,"
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