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The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem

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Listed:
  • David S Ahn
  • Santiago Oliveros

Abstract

Should two issues be decided jointly by a single committee or in separately by different committees? Similarly, should two defendants be tried together in a joint trial or tried separately in severed trials? Multiplicity of issues or defendants introduces novel strategic considerations. As in the standard Condorcet Jury Theorem, we consider large committees with common values and incomplete information. Our main result is that the joint trial by a single committee can aggregate information if and only if the severed trials by separate committees can aggregate information. Specifically, suppose that either for the joint trial or for the severed trials there exists a sequence of equilibria that implements the optimal outcome with probability approaching one as the number of voters goes to infinity. Then a sequence of equilibria with similar asymptotic efficiency exists for the other format. Thus, the advantage of either format cannot hinge on pure information aggregation with many signals.
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Suggested Citation

  • David S Ahn & Santiago Oliveros, 2010. "The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000268, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000268
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. List, Christian & Polak, Ben, 2010. "Introduction to judgment aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 441-466, March.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:01:p:34-45_20 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:92:y:1998:i:02:p:413-418_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Bozbay, Irem, 2012. "Truth-Seeking Judgment Aggregation over Interconnected Issues," Working Papers 2012:31, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    5. Bozbay, İrem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans, 2014. "Judgment aggregation in search for the truth," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 571-590.
    6. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2015. "Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 34-42.
    7. David S. Ahn & Santiago Oliveros, 2012. "Combinatorial Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 89-141, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:jeborg:v:148:y:2018:i:c:p:135-149 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2014. "On the optimal composition of committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 973-980, December.
    3. Bracco, Emanuele & Revelli, Federico, 2018. "Concurrent elections and political accountability: Evidence from Italian local elections," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 135-149.
    4. Dietrich, Franz, 2016. "Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 113-136.
    5. repec:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:4:p:685-711 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Saori CHIBA, "undated". "Hidden Profiles and Persuasion Cascades in Group Decision-Making," Discussion papers e-18-001, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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