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Truth-Tracking Judgment Aggregation Over Interconnected Issues

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  • Irem Bozbay

    (University of Surrey)

Abstract

This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. Voters share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts may occur both between and within voters. Following Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters (2014), we assume strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting and we want to determine voting rules which induces an ecient Bayesian Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies, hence lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. Unlike in judgment aggregation problems with two independent issues where it is always possible to aggregate information eciently, efficient information aggregation is not always possible with interconnected issues. We characterize the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Irem Bozbay, 2015. "Truth-Tracking Judgment Aggregation Over Interconnected Issues," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0916, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    • Handle: RePEc:sur:surrec:0916
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    File URL: https://repec.som.surrey.ac.uk/2016/DP09-16.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bozbay, İrem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans, 2014. "Judgment aggregation in search for the truth," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 571-590.
    2. Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz, 2012. "Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation," Working Papers 2012-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    4. Dietrich, Franz, 2016. "Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 113-136.
    5. Bozbay, Irem & Peters, Hans, 2019. "Information aggregation with a continuum of types," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 46-49.
    6. Marcus Pivato, 2013. "Voting rules as statistical estimators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 581-630, February.
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    8. Christian List, 2005. "The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 3-32, May.
    9. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-424, June.
    10. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2015. "Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 34-42.
    11. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 651-665.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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