Generalized Similarity Judgments: An Alternative Explanation for Choice Anomalies
Rubinstein's (1988) procedure for choosing between risky prospects, based, in part, upon similarities between prizes and probabilities across lotteries, is modified and extended to apply to a more general class of binary choices. This modified procedure is shown to imply behaviors following from Loomes and Sugden's (1982) Regret Theory, although under more general conditions, and provides an alternative explanation for much of the data which led to the specification of Prospect Theory's value and decision weighing functions. The procedure also explains observed violations of stochastic dominance, transitivity, and invariance not accounted for in available alternatives to expected utility. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S251-78, October.
- Battalio, Raymond C & Kagel, John H & Jiranyakul, Komain, 1990. " Testing between Alternative Models of Choice under Uncertainty: Some Initial Results," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 25-50, March.
- Camerer, Colin F, 1989. " An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 61-104, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:7644. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.