Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences
Risk and time are intertwined. The present is known while the future is inherently risky. This is problematic when studying time preferences since uncontrolled risk can generate apparently present-biased behavior. We systematically manipulate risk in an intertemporal choice experiment. Discounted expected utility performs well with risk, but when certainty is added common ratio predictions fail sharply. The data cannot be explained by prospect theory, hyperbolic discounting, or preferences for resolution of uncertainty, but seem consistent with a direct preference for certainty. The data suggest strongly a difference between risk and time preferences. (JEL C91 D81 D91)
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- Yoram Halevy, 2008.
"Strotz Meets Allais: Diminishing Impatience and the Certainty Effect,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1145-1162, June.
- Halevy, Yoram, 2004. "Strotz meets Allais: Diminishing Impatience and the Certainty Effect," Microeconomics.ca working papers yoram_halevy-2004-16, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 25 Feb 2014.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
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