Existence and Testable Implications of Extreme Stable Matchings
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- Federico Echenique, 2005.
"A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues,"
Game Theory and Information
- Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2007. "A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 46-71, April.
- Federico Echenique & Mehmet B. Yenmez, 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers 2005.120, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, Mehmet B., 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers 1226, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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