Kantian Optimization, Social Ethos, and Pareto Efficiency
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- John E. Roemer, 2012. "Kantian Optimization, Social Ethos, and Pareto Efficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1854, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1664-1683, July.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 8896226, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
- Luis Rayo, 2007. "Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 937-963.
- Klimenko, Mikhail & Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 2008.
"Recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 475-499, March.
- Klimenko, Mikhail & Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 2001. "Recurrent Trade Agreements and the Value of External Enforcement," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt9xm2x5w7, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Kenneth L. Judd & Sevin Yeltekin & James Conklin, 2003. "Computing Supergame Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1239-1254, July.
- Jonathan Levin, 2002. "Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1075-1103.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001.
"Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1799, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007.
"Collusion under monitoring of sales,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 314-331, June.
- Joseph E Harrington & Jr Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Collusion under Monitoring of Sales," Economics Working Paper Archive 509, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005.
- Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Harrington, Joseph E., 2005. "Collusion under Monitoring of Sales," Research Papers 1885, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Fong, Yuk-fai & Surti, Jay, 2009. "The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 277-291, September.
- Katherine Doornik, 2006. "Relational Contracting in Partnerships," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 517-548, June.
- Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012.
"Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1191-1221.
- Goldluecke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2010. "In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 332, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Andrew T. Ching, 2010.
"A Dynamic Oligopoly Structural Model For The Prescription Drug Market After Patent Expiration,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1175-1207, November.
- Andrew Ching, 2004. "A Dynamic Oligopoly Structural Model for the Prescription Drug Market After Patent Expiration," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 735, Econometric Society.
- MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989.
"Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment,"
Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-480, March.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 1986. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Working Papers 585, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- David Besanko & Ulrich Doraszelski & Yaroslav Kryukov & Mark Satterthwaite, 2010. "Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 453-508, March.
- Kranz, Sebastian & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 259, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- C. Lanier Benkard, 2000. "Learning and Forgetting: The Dynamics of Aircraft Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
- Johannes Hörner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2011.
"Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem,"
Econometric Society, vol. 79(4), pages 1277-1318, July.
- Nicolas Vieille & Johannes Hörner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem," Post-Print hal-00609191, HAL.
- Baliga, Sandeep & Evans, Robert, 2000. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 159-176, November.
- Gautam Gowrisankaran & Robert J. Town, 1997. "Dynamic Equilibrium in the Hospital Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 45-74, March.
- David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
More about this item
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2012-04-23 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-04-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SOC-2012-04-23 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000407. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.