History, Expectations, and Leadership in Evolution of Cooperation
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- Van Zandt, Timothy & Vives, Xavier, 2003.
"Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Van Zandt, Timothy & Vives, Xavier, 2007. "Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 339-360, May.
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