Evolutionary Dynamical Pattern of 'Coyness and Philandering': Evidence from Experimental Economics
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- Reinhard Selten & Thorsten Chmura, 2005.
"Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2 Games,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse33_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January.
- repec:ams:ndfwpp:03-11 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1998. "A comparison of learning and replicator dynamics using experimental data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 263-280, April.
- Bouchez, Nicole & Friedman, Daniel, 2008.
"Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games,"
Handbook of Experimental Economics Results,
- Nicole Marie Bouchez & Daniel Friedman, 2001. "Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 00/2, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2001.
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