Evolutionary Dynamical Pattern of 'Coyness and Philandering': Evidence from Experimental Economics
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References listed on IDEAS
- Reinhard Selten & Thorsten Chmura, 2008. "Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2-Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 938-966, June.
- Bouchez, Nicole & Friedman, Daniel, 2008.
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- repec:ams:ndfwpp:03-11 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1998. "A comparison of learning and replicator dynamics using experimental data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 263-280, April.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-10-06 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-10-06 (Experimental Economics)
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