On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Symmetric Bargaining Games
We use a dynamical systems approach to model the origin of bargaining conventions and report the results of a symmetric bargaining game experiment. Our experiment also provides evidence on the psychological salience of symmetry and efficiency. The observed behavior in the experiment was systematic, replicable, and roughly consistent with the dynamical systems approach. For instance, we do observe unequal-division conventions emerging in communities of symmetrically endowed subjects. Coauthors are Raymond Battalio, Sondip Mathur, Patsy Van Huyck.
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Volume (Year): 24 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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