How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?

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How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?

Author Info

Mailath, G.J.
Samuelson, L.

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Abstract

We show that a strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 9611.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9611

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

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Related research
Keywords: GAMES; GAME THEORY;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1997. "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 193-218, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Jeroen M. Swinkels, . "How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 045, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath, 1996. "How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?," Discussion Papers 1161, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

repec:att:wimass:19925 is not listed on IDEAS
Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," Discussion Papers 295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Mailath George J. & Samuelson Larry & Swinkels Jeroen M., 1994. "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 325-371, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- George J. Mailath, 1993. "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Discussion Papers 1041, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Rahmi Ilkiliç, 2005. "Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network Formation," Working Papers 2005.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Rahmi İlkılıç, 2009. "Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 51-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2007. "'On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000825, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001859, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2007. "On Forward Induction," Research Papers 1955, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2007. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000788, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000618, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "On Forward Induction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 1-28, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
John Hillas, 1996. "On the Relation Between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games," Game Theory and Information 9605002, EconWPA, revised 14 May 1996. [Downloadable!]

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