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Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic two-player games

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Srihari Govindan
Robert Wilson

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 814577000000000231.

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Date of creation: 31 May 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000231

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  1. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2002. "Maximal stable sets of two-player games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 557-566. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 627-49, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 273-302, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1992. "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 553-564, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "On Forward Induction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 1-28, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Koller, Daphne & Megiddo, Nimrod, 1992. "The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 528-552, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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