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On the Equivalence between (Quasi)-perfect and sequential equilibria

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  • Carlos Pimienta

    (School of Economics, The University of New South Wales)

  • Jianfei Shen

    (School of Economics, The University of New South Wales)

Abstract

We prove the generic equivalence between quasi-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Combining this result with Blume and Zame (1994) shows that perfect, quasi-perfect and sequential equilibrium coincide in generic games.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Pimienta & Jianfei Shen, 2011. "On the Equivalence between (Quasi)-perfect and sequential equilibria," Discussion Papers 2012-01, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    • Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2012-01
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    File URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2012-01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vida, Péter & Honryo, Takakazu, 2021. "Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 102-112.
    2. Etessami, Kousha, 2021. "The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an n-player extensive form game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 107-140.
    3. Blume, Larry & Meier, Martin, 2019. "Perfect Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium," IHS Working Paper Series 4, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    4. Gatti, Nicola & Gilli, Mario & Marchesi, Alberto, 2020. "A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 240-255.
    5. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021. "The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Backwards induction; perfect equilibrium; quasi-perfect equilibrium; sequential equilibrium; lower-hemicontinuity; upper-hemicontinuity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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